BABBITT V. BUMPUS.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of MIchigan.
BABBITT v. BUMPUS.
In the absence of a special contract, an attorney is not an insurer of the result
of the litigation which he undertakes. He. is bound only to ordinary skill, care,
intelligence and diligence, and good faith. An error for which he will be liable
must be so gross as to render wholly improbable any disagreement among good
lawyers as to the manner of the performance of the service in the particular
instance.
In an action for his fees the attorney is a competent witness as to the value of
his services and may show his knowledge and experience. He may likewise testify as to the charges of other attorneys for like services.
Evidence that the attorneys on the other side charged less than the plaintiff and
that their services were of as great or greater value, is irrelevant.
Where, after a settlement procured by the attorney, a second suit is brought
against the client through no fault of the attorney, evidence as to the damage sustained by the client by the bringing of the second suit, is inadmissible.
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge said: "An attorney is obliged to do
the very best he can. In this case it has been done. * ** I don't think that you
are warranted by the testimony in saying that B (the attorney) was in any way
negligent." Held, error.

Error to the Circuit Court of Wayne County.
S. W Burroughs for appellant.
Conely, Maybury & Lucking for appellee.
C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, January
This action is brought by plaintiff to recover of the
defendant the value of services rendered for her as attorney and
counselor-at-law in the prosecution of a suit in the Circuit
Court for the County of Washtenaw, in chancery, wherein
Isaac N. Bumpus was complainant and Myron M. Bumpus was
defendant-a partition case-'for the division of eighty acres
of land. The plaintiff appeared in the case for defendant and
disclaimed, Myron having, before the suit was commenced,
quit-claimed his interest in the land to defendant, and nothing
further seems to have been done in the case. Also, for services in a suit in the Wayne Circuit Court, in chancery, wherein
the defendant and Samuel R. Bumpus were complainants, and
Isaac N. Bumpus was defendant, for the purpose of obtaining
title to certain lands held by Isaac, who was a son of Mrs.
Bumpus. The complainant's bill was dismissed on the hearSHERWOOD,
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ing, and complainant appealed to this Court and the decree was
affirmed, plaintiff being their solicitor therein. See 59 Mich
95. Also, for retainer and services in a suit in the Circuit
Court for the County of Washtenaw, in chancery, wherein
Isaac N. Bumpus was complainant, and Mrs. Bumpus and her
husband were defendants. This suit was to obtain specific performance of a contract. The defendants were beaten on the
hearing, and a decree of $8,ooo was rendered against Mrs.
Bumpus. From this decree she appealed to this Court, and
the decree was reversed, and the complainant's bill was dismissed. See 53 Mich. 346. Also, for services in a partition
case, in chancery, in the Washtenaw circuit, wherein Isaac N.
Bumpus was complainant, against Mrs. Bumpus and others'.
This case was subsequently settled. Also, for retainer and services in the case of the People against Myron M. Bumpus, informed against for the crime of murder. It is for retainer and
services and disbursements in these cases that the plaintiff
makes his claim against the defendant, amounting, as he presents his bill, to the sum of $2,165.25, and upon which he credits the defendant with the payment of $1,484.75, and brings
his suit for the balance, being $680.50.
Defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that
she would show on the trial, set-off, under the common counts,
to the amount of $1,635.75 ; and further, that such services, if
rendered for the defendant, were so rendered under an agreement that the plaintiff was to have a retainer in each case,
when defendant was a party, of $25, and the further sum of
$25 per day for each day that the plaintiff was actually engaged in Court upon the trial and hearing of said cases, and
that the retainers were to be full pay for all other services, and
that she has fully performed her said agreement with the plaintiff; that the plaintifffailed and neglected to perform his agree.
ment with her, but negligently did her business, failed to take
and perfect appeals when he should have done so, and mismanaged her said business, and so improperly advised her in
relation thereto as to unnecessarily cause her to pay and lay
out large sums of money, which she should recoup against the
plaintiff Upon the trial of the case the plaintiff recovered a
verdict for $5oo. The defendant brings error, basing the same
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upon the rulings of the Court upon receiving the testimony
(all of which appears in the record), as well as upon the charge
and refusals to charge.
The plaintiff was sworn in his own behalf as to the value of
his services, and the first and second errors assigned are aimed
at this testimony. He was a competent witness, under our
statute, for that purpose, and like all other witnesses upon that
subject, was entitled to show his own experience and knowledge, and give his judgment as to the value of his services,
and upon his own theory of the case, which was to the effect
that there was no special agreement as to the amount he was
to have for his work, but that, when he was inquired of by his
client, or by those who were authorized by her to engage his
services, as to what he charged, he told them his retainer was
$25, and for services such sums as are stated in his bill, and it
was entirely competent for him to testify as to his knowledge
of the charges of other attorneys for like services in similar
cases. He thereby only gave evidence of his own qualifications to speak of the value of his own services charged for,
and this is always proper. And the same may be said of the
witness Robinson's testimony, referred to in the eighth assignment of error, relating to the same subject. No error was
committed in any of these rulings.
Thirteen assignments of error relate to the exclusion of testimony on the part of the defendant, showing that less was
charged by the attorneys for the other side, in the same causes
when the plaintiff was engaged for her, than was charged by
the plaintiff, and that the services of the former were quite as
important, and of as much, or even greater, value than were
those of the plaintiff The circuit judge did right in rejecting
this testimony. The defendant's counsel might not have charged
what their services were worth, or even performed them gratuitously, as is often the case where parties are unable to pay.
The Court allowed the plaintiff, in describing the services he
performed for the defendant, to say that, "I -had consultations
with Mary Ann Bumpus, Samuel R. Bumpus, Myron Bumpus,
and a great number of witnesses." Defendant moved to strike
this testimony out, because such service was not specifically
stated in the declaration or bill of items. This was not done.
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There was no error in this ruling. The testimony descriptive
of the character of the services charged for wag admissible
under the pleadings. It was also competent to ask the plaintiff, when on the stand, what was the amount involved in the
five suits, or in any one or more of them; also the total amount
charged for his services in either or all of them. The amount
involved in the issue has very much to do with the value of the
services rendered, and the responsibility assumed by the attorney. The Court stated the law correctly in his rulings upon
these several subjects. The total amount charged'was certainly
competent, as the reasonableness of this was one of the questions to be passed upon by the jury, if they did not find a contract relating thereto, as claimed by either of the parties.
Six exceptions were taken by defendant's counsel to remarks
made by the circuit judge which she deemed prejudicial to her
case, and which it is claimed ought not to have been made.
We have examined what was said on these several occasions
by the circuit judge, as it appears in the record, and we do not
think either of these exceptions should be sustained. *A lawyer
is not an insurer of the result in a case in which he is employed,
unless he makes a special contract to that effect, and for that
purpose. Neither is there any implied contract when he is
employed in a case, or any matter of legal business, that he
will bring to bear learning, skill, or ability beyond that of the
average of his profession. Nor can more than ordinary care
and diligence be required of him, without a special contract
made, requiring it. Any other rule would subject his rights
to be controlled by the vagaries and imaginations of witnesses
and jurors, and not infrequently to the errors committed by
courts. This the law never has done; and the fact that the
best lawyers in the country find themselves mistaken as to
what the law is, and are constantly differing as to the application of the law to a given state of facts, and even the ablest
jurists find themselves frequently differing as to both, shows
both the fallacy and danger of any other doctrine; and especially is this so as to questions of practice, the construction of
statutes, and particularly those arising under our criminal and
probate laws. Frequently we find the decisions of courts of
last resort in the different States directly opposed to each other
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upon the same questions, and resting upon the same state of
facts. These all admonish courts and jurors that great care
and consideration should be given to questions involving the
proper service to be rendered by attorneys when they have.
acted in good faith, and with a fair degree of intelligence, in the
discharge of their duties, when employed under the usual implied contract. Under such circumstances, the errors which
may be made by them must be very gross before the attorney
can be held responsible. They should be such as to render
wholly improbable a disagreement among good lawyers as to
the character of the services required to be performed, and as
to the manner of its performance under all the circumstances
in the given case, before such responsibility attaches. We find
no error under either or any of these exceptions, committed in
the rulings of the circuit judge upon this subject.
The next group of exceptions, numbering four, relates to the
testimony given by witness Crone. They mostly concerned the
value of Babbitt's services and the manner in which he conducted the defendant's business, and certain transactions and telegrams between counsel. We have examined them all in the
record, and find no fault in the judge's rulings concerning them.
The next four assignments presented by defendant, and argued,
are: First.Referring to one of defendant's suits which-was discontinued, defendant's counsel asked witness Myron Bumpus,
"Did I advise you [meaning Mr. Burroughs] to discontinue
it?" Second. "Why did your mother, through you, [Myron]
take Mr. Babbitt's advice, rather than mine ?" (meaning Mr.
Burroughs.) Third. "Well, about how much will it cost you
to go on with that case ?" Fourth. "Was it not because Mr.
Babbitt was your attorney of record, and because he had control of the case as such ?" These questions were all put to the
witness, Myron Bumpus, who, it was claimed, acted for his
mother, the defendant, and were all irrelevant under the view
we take of the case, and the Court committed no error in ex"cluding the answers.
It appears, when the settlement of one of the suits occurred,
Myron, who acted for his mother, requested Mr. Babbitt to so
make it that it would be final as to all matters between her and
Isaac Bumpus, the plaintiff This Isaac's counsel would not
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consent to, and the settlement was made without it, and Isaac
brought suit again against the defendant, and about three
months thereafter discontinued it. This second suit was
brought in the Wayne circuit, and counsel for defendant asked
Myron, when on the stand, "What was the damage you sustained by the bringing of the Wayne county suit after the settlement ?" The witness was not allowed to answer, and, we
think, properly so. It did not appear that it was by Babbitt's
fault that the defendant was subjected to the claimed expense.
This was defendant's thirty-fourth assignment of error.
We see nothing in defendant's tenth, thirty-second, or thirtythird assignments of error needing further notice. None of
them can be sustained.
At the close of the trial the defendant's counsel asked the
Court to instruct the jury as follows:
" (5) That Myron Bumpus, without conflict, appears to have had the management of defendant's business in all the litigation referred to in this case, for which
the plaintiff seeks to recover; and that the bargain, either under plaintiff's or defendant's version, was made by and between plaintiff and Myron; and that, if the
jury believe from Myron's testimony that some time after plaintiff came to Detroit
in the interest of Myron in the murder case, and that this was after all the services
were performed by plaintiff, and that Myron called at the office of Mr. Babbitt, and
there requested the plaintiff to show his books and make a settlement, and that
plaintiff refused so to do. claiming that it was unnecessary, as he .(plaintiff) had
looked his books over and found that he was indebted to defendant, having received
enough moneys to pay him for his services, then and in such case the plaintiff cannot recover, and the verdict of the jury must be for defendant."
" (7) Plaintiff has introduced testimony tending to show the value of his services,
and, if he relies upon value, rather than upon his express contract as alleged, he
must stand by the actual value of his services, and must accept, under the law, such
amounts as those services were reasonably worth; and if, from all the testimony in
this case, the jury believe the amounts which he has received, and of which he acknowledges credits, were sufficient in amount to compensate him for his services,
then and in such case he cannot recover, and the verdict of the jury must be for the
defendant."

We think these requests state the law applicable to the facts
in this case in terse and succinct language, and we can see no
reason why they should not have been given; and their substance was really not given in the general charge, or, if it was, it
was in a manner that might be easily misunderstood by the jury.
A party has the right to have the law of his case go to the
jury in its plainest, simplest form; and if it is properly em-
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bodied in a request in that form, prepared by counsel, and furnished to the Court, it ought to be thus given, and the request
should not be ignored by the Court. We have had occasion
to allude to this subject before, and when the Court declines
to give such requests, it must appear that the substance of them
has been as well given by the Court in its own language, or
the omission will be error.
The defendant requested the Court to submit five special
questions, in writing, to the jury, for their special findings, as
follows:
"(i) What was the value of plaintiff's services?"
"(2) Has not defendant paid and caused to have been paid to plaintiff, sufficient
amounts of money and produce to compensate him in full for his services and
expenses ?"
"(3) Has not defendant paid and caused to have been paid to plaintiff the following amounts, to wit: $1,484.85; credited produce admitted, $45.46; note of
August 15, 1883, amounting to $i5o; total, $x.68o.31 ?"
"(4) At the time plaintiff was discharged, in April or May, 1883, did not plaintiff admit to Myron that he had looked the matter all over, and that he was in
defendant's debt at the time ?"
"(5) Was not the bargain between plaintiff and defendant, that plaintiff was to
have had $25 for each retainer, and $25 for his services each day actually engaged
in the courts, and expenses, for his services?"
'The Court. I will decline to do that, Mr. Burroughs."

The first, second, and third of these special requests should
have been submitted to tie jury. They ask for the finding of
questions of fact, and it was the privilege of the defendant to
have them found specially.
We think when the Court said, in speaking of the duty of
the plaintiff while in the service of the defendant as her attorney, "Now, an attorney is obliged to do the very best he can.
In this case here, it has been done. * * * I don't think you
are warranted, by the testimony, in saying that Mr. Babbitt
was in any way negligent," he went too far. While these
statements may not have prejudiced the rights of the defendant
before the jury, it is not our privilege to say they did not.
They might have done so, and such certainly was their tendency. We think it was error.
For the errors mentioned, the judgment must be reversed,
and a new trial granted.
The other Justices concurred.
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An attorney is liable to his client for

(x848), 2 Cush. (Mass.) 3z6; Haing

gross negligence, or gross ignorance, in

v. Halleck (t859), 13 Cal. 203; .Nsbet
v. Lawson (x846), i Ga. 275; Cox v.
Sullivan (1849), 7 Id. 144; Holmesv.
Peck (1849), 1 R. I. 242; Suydam v.
Vance (184o), U. S. C. Ct. Dist. Ind.,
2 McLean 99; Aforrill v. Graham
(1864), 27 Tex. 646; Reilly v. Cavanaugh (1868), 29 Ind. 435; Mardisv.
Shackleford(1842),4Ala. 493; Walker
v. Scott (853), x3 Ark. 644; Stevens
v. Walker (1870), 55 111 151;. Chase
v. Heaney (1873), 70 Id. 268.

the performance of his prolessional du-

ties:, Pennington v. Yell (185o), i
Ark. 212; Evans v. Watrous (1835),
2 Por. (Ala.) 20 5 ; Montriou v. Jeffreys(1825),2C.&P. II3; Kz'1sonv.
Russ (184), 20 Me. 421; Weimerv.
Sloane (1854), U. S. D. Ct., Dist. Ohio,
6 McLean 259; Ex parte Giberson
(1835), U. S. C. Ct., Dist. Columbia, 4
Cranch C. C. Rep. 503; Coxv. Sullivan
(1849),7 Ga. i44; O'Barrv.A4lexander
(1867), 37 Id. 195; Holmes v. Peck
In Godefroy v. Dalton (183o), 6
(1849), I R. 1. 242; Wilcox v. PlumBing. 467; 4 Moo. & P. 149, TINDAL,
mer (1830), 4 Pet. (29 U. S.), 172;
C. J., explained the rule of an attorney's
Wynn v. Wilson (1855), U. S. C. Ct.
liability with much clearness:
"It
Dist. Ark., Hemp. 698; Bowman v.
would be extremely difficult to define
Tallman (1864), 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
the exact limit by which the skill and
212; Gambetrt v. Hart (1872), 44 Cal.
diligence which an attorney undertakes
542; Gallaher v. Thompson (1833),
to furnish in the conduct of a case, is
Wright, Chan. (Ohio) 466; Stevens v.
hounded; or to trace precisely the diWalker (x870),55 I11. 151; Watson v.
viding line between that reasonable
Mfuirhead (1868), 57 Pa. 161.
skill and diligence which appears to
satisfy his undertaking, and that crassa
Gross Neglzlence Detfined.
negligentia,or lata culpa, mentioned in
The want of ordinary skill and care
some of the cases, for which he is unand reasonable diligence, is, in the case
doubtedly responsible. The cases, howof an attorney, gross negligence; Pen- ever, appear to establish, in general, that
nington v. Yell (1850), i1 Ark. 212.
an attorney is liable for the consequenHence, where a client has suffered
ces of ignorance or non-observance of
damage through the gross negligence,
the rules of practice; for want of care
or gross ignorance, of his attorney, he
in the preparation of the cause for trial,
has a right of action against him for the
or of attendance thereon, with his witdamages sustained: Hopping v. Quin
nesses; and for the mismanagement of
(1834), 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 517 ; Estate so much of the conduct of a cause as
of.A. B. (z866), I Tuck. (N. Y.) 247;
is usually and ordinarily allotted to his
Hatch v. Fogerty(1871), io Abb. Prac.
department of the profession. But, on
N. S. (N. Y.) 147: Egglestonv. Board- the other hand, he is not answerable for
man (1877), 37 Mich. 14; Morrillv. error in judgment, upon points of new
Graham (1864), 27 Tex. 646; Sevier
occurrence, or of nice and doubtful conv. Iolliday (1840), 2 Ark. 512; Pal- struction, or of such as are usually enmtrv. Ashly (1840), 3 Id. 75; Wil- trusted to men in the higher branch of
son v. Russ(i84), 20 Me. 421; Evans
the profession of the law."
v. Watrous (1835), 2 Por. (Ala.) 205;
And in an American case (Bowiman
O'Barrv. Alexander (1867), 37 Ga.
v. Tanlman (1864), 27 How. Pr. (N.
195; Caverly v. AcOwen (x878), 123
Y.) 274, it is said: "There is no imMass. 574; Gleason v. Clark (82), 9
plied agreement in the relation of counCow. (N. Y.) 57; Wilson v. Cojin
sel and client, or in the employment of
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the former by the latter, that the former
will guarantee the success of his proceedings in a suit, or the soundness of
his opinions, or that they will bp ultimately sustained by a court of last
resort. * * * He only undertakes to
avoid errors which no member of his
profession, of ordinary prudence, diligence and skill, would commit. * * *
It is not enough that doubts may be
raised of the soundness of his opinions
or correctness of his course, unless they
are accompanied by the absence of all
reasonable doubts of the propriety of an
opposite course or opinion in the mind
of every member of his profession of
ordinary skill, sagacity, and prudence,
caused by a decisiveness of reason and
authority in its favor."
Counseland Attorneys.
In England, while attorneys are responsible to their clients for negligence,
counsel and barristers are not. In the
'United States this distinction does not
exist: Story on Agency,
24, note.
The negligence of the client does not
affect the liability of the attorney: Cox
v. Sullivan (1849), 7 Ga. 144.
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Owen (1878), 123 Mass. 574; Bulmer
v. Gilman, supra.
Where a father, whose minor son had
received injuries through the negligence
of a third party, employs counsel to sue
him for damages, no legal obligation is,
in the absence of an express understanding, imposed on such counsel, to
bring suit in the name of the father, as
well as in that of the son: Youngman
v. Miller (188I), 98 Pa. I96.
Conveyancing.
In examining titles to real estate and
making abstracts, one impliedly undertakes that he possesses the requisite
knowledge and skill, and will use due
and ordinary care in the performance of
the duty; and for a failure in either
of these respects, resulting in damages,
the party injured is entitled to recover:
Chase v. Heaney (1873), 70 Ill. 268;
Rankin v. Schaefer (1877), 4 Mo. App.
io8. He cannot set up, in defence to
an action for damages for his negligence in overlooking a lien, that such
lien was erroneous or of doubtful validity: Gilnan v. Hovey (1858), 26
Mo. 280.

An attorney employed to record a
mortgage, but who neglects to do so
An attorney is not liable for a misuntil after other subsequent incumtake in a point of law which is in doubt, brances have been recorded, is liable
or for a wrong construction of a doubt- immediately to the mortgagee for all the
ful statute: ,orrill.v. Graham (1864),
damages which are likely to be sustained
27Tex.646; Crosbiev.Aurhy (1858),
byhisdefault: AIillerv. Wilson (1854),
8 Ir. C. L. 301; Elkinglon v. Holland 24 Pa. 114. But where a person,
r
(1842), 9 M. & WA
. 659; Bulmer v. having title papers to land placed in
Gilman (1842), 4 M. & G. io8. He his hands as agent and attorney, with
cannot be charged with negligence,
authority to effect a sale of the land, enwhere he accepts as a correct expositrusted the papers to a third person for
tion of the law, a solemn decision of
examination and with a view of making
the Supreme Court of the State: Marsh a sale to him, and the party so entrusted
with the papers; being charged with
v. Whitemore (1874), 21 Wall. (88U. S.)
178; Hastings v. Halleck (1859), 13 some crime, absconded and took the
Cal. 203. An error of judgment upon
papers with him, it was held that this
a doubtful question of the construction
act of the agent, which resulted in a
of a statute is not evidence of a want of loss of the papers, was not negligence
skill or of negligence: Caverley v. Me- on his part, so as to impose any liability
Mistakes of Law.
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on him therefor: Stanberry v. Moore
(1870), 56 Ill.
472.
An attorney, who is also a notary
public, is liable for neglect in not recording a mortgage which he had
drawn for his client and agreed to deliver to the recording officer: Stott v.
Harrison(18go), 73 Ind. 17.
An attorney, employed to draw a
building contract, is not liable for not
filing the contract so as to prevent liens
from attaching: Fenaille v. Coudert
(1882), 44 N. J. L. 286. A conveyancer is not liable for passing a title
with an incumbrance, when, in his
opinion, the incumbrance was not legally a lien, though it turns out otherwise. In Watson v. ATuirhead (1868),
57 Pa. 16i, the Court say: "Thebus.
iness of a conveyancer is one of great
importance and responsibility. It requires an acquaintance with the general principles of the law of real property and a large amount of practical
knowledge, which can only be derived
from experience. In England, it has
been pursued by lawyers of the greatest
eminence. As our titles become more
complex, with the increase of wealth,
and t'e deires which always accompany it, to continue it in our name and
family as long as the law will permit,
it will become more and more necessary that gentlemen prepared by a
course of liberal education and previous study, should devote themselves to
it. There have been, and still are, such
among us. The rule of liability for
erroirs of judgment, as applied to them,
ought to be the same as in the case of
gentlemen in the practice of law or
medicine. It is not a mere art, but a
science. 'That part of the profession,' said Lord MANSFIELD, ' which
is carried on by attorneys, is liberal and
reputable, as well as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with
honor and integrity; and they ought to
be protected, when they act to the best

of their skill and knowledge. But
every man is liable to error; and I
should be very sorry that it should be
takeq for granted that an attorney is
answerable for every error or mistake.
* * * * A counsel may mistake, as
well as an attorney. Yet, no one will
say that a counsel, who has been mistaken, shall be charged. * * * Not
only counsel, but judges, may differ, or
doubt, or take time to consider. Therefore an attorney ought not to be liable
in case of a reasonable doubt: Pittv.
Yalden (1767), 4 Burr. 2060.' The
rule declared by Lord MANSFIELD has
been followed in all the subsequent
cases. ' No attorney,' said C. J. ABBOTT, ' is bound to know all the law.
God forbid that it should be imagined
that an attorney, or a counsel, or even
a judge, is bound to know all the law;
or that an attorney is to lose his fair
recompense, on account of an error,
being such an error as a cautious man
might fall into:' Montriou v. Jfery.r
(1825), 2 C. & P. 113."
Ignoranceof Practice.
[Hence, where an attorney produced
the prothonotary's book in evidence, instead of the record of a judgment, and
his case was therefore nonsuited, the
attorney was not liable, because negligence had been the gist of the action,
and the judgment was only alleged as
the consequence of that negligence:
Godefroy v. Dalton (1830), 6 Bing. 460.
But an attorney is liable for mistakes
of well-known principles and rules of
law: Goodman v. Walker (1857), 30
Ala. 482; AIorrill v. Graham (1864),
27 Tex. 646; as that a note is not due
until the expiration of the three days of
grace, and cannot be sued on before
that: Happing v. Quinn (1834), 12
Wend. (N. Y.) 517. In Goodman v.
Walker, STONE, J., said: " I lay down
the rule, then, for the determination of
this case as follows: If the law govern-
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ing the bringing of this suit was well
and clearly defined, both in the text
books and in our decisions, and if the
rule had existed and been published
long enough to justify the belief that it
was known to the profession, then a
disregard of such rule by an attorney-atlaw renders him accountable for the
losses caused by such negligence or
want of skill; negligence, if, knowing
the rule, he disregarded it; want of
skill, if he was ignorant of the rule."
So the disregard of a plain statutory provision is negligence for which the attorney is liable: Caverlv.M rOwen(I878),
123 Mass. 575; EstateofA. B. (1866),
I Tuck. (N. Y.) 247.
Assent of Client to Ignorance of Attorney.
[Where an attorney for a defendant
paid the amount of the judgment against
his client, to the clerk of the Court,
with the assent of his client, who also
knew that the judgment creditor had
not been paid by the clerk; and such
payment did not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment; and the clerk,
after nine or ten months' further incumbency in his office, died insolvent: the
Court held that the attorney was acting
merely as agent, and not as a professional man, and there being entire good
faith, there could not be any recovery
against such agent. "Especially should
this be so, where, as here, the principal
is guilty of negligence after having been
directly put upon inquiry. When the
appellee was informed, as he was at
least twice, that the judgment creditor
had not received the money, he ought
to have taken some steps to see that it
reached her:" ELLIOT'r, C. J., p. 230.
[Otherwise the attorney would have
been liable; for the same judge said:
"It is the duty of a lawyer to know
whether public matters, such as the duties of the officers connected with the
court in which he practices, are regu-

lated by the statute. A lawyer who
does not know whether the duties of
the clerk of the court, in which his professional duties are performed, are, or
are not, defined by statute, cannot be
deemed to possess competent skill. It
is a lawyer's duty to know the elementary rules of law upon familiar matters
of practice, as well as the settled rules
governing matters which spring out of
the ordinary transactions of every-day
life, and which are of frequent application. A rudimental knowledge of the
law would have acquainted the appellants' intestate with the elementary rule,
that payment must be made to the creditor, or to some one duly authorized to
act for him. A rule so long settled,
and so familiar, ought to be known to
allwho assume the character of lawyers. A knowledge of the statutes
would have shown the intestate that
there was, in them, no provision changing the familiar and long established
rule. It must be held that if the intestate was the appellee's attorney when he
paid the money to Edsall [the court
clerk], and paid it as his attorney, a
right of action accrued to the appellee
[the client and judgment debtor], because competent skill was either not
possessed, or was not exercised :" Id.
227-8.

Drazin- Papers and Pleadings.
The attorney is liable for mistakes
negligently made in drawing papers and
pleadings: Reilly v. Cavanaugh(1868),
29 Ind.435 ; Oldham v. Sparks (1866),
28 Tex. 425 ; Fitch v. Scott (1839), 3
How. (Miss.) 314; lWatson v. Aluirhead (1868), 57 Pa.161 ; as for suing
for twelve dollars instead of twelve
hundred: Varizum v. Afartin (1834),
15 Pick. (Mass.) 44o. But he cannot
be held liable for his mistake in misdescribing land on which he was employed to enforce his client's lien, if,
notwithstanding, it does not appear that
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his client has sustained damage: Joyv.
Mforgan (z886), 35 Minn. 184.
Prosecution of Suit.
It is negligence in an attorney to
bring an action too soon: Hopping v.
Quin (1834), 12 Vend. (N. Y.) 517,
or to neglect to bring it until too late to
recover: Smedes v. Elmendorf(1808),
3 Johns. (N. Y.) 185; Oldham v.
Sparks (1866); 28 Tex. 425; Stevens
v. Walker (1870), 55 Ill. 151.
Also, to bring suit in the wrong
county: Remp v. Burt (1833), 4 B. &
Ad. 424; or, in a court which has not
jurisdiction of the suit: Williams v.
Gibbs (1836), 5 Ad. & E. 2o8; or, to
improperly dismiss a suit: Waalpole v.
Carlisle (1869), 32 Ind. 415; CooPezooodv. Baldwin (1852), 25 Miss. 129;
or, to neglect to prosecute a motion for
a new trial whereby it is not finally
awarded to his client: Draisv. Hogan
(1875), 50 Cal. 121.
It is the duty of the attorney, employed to collect a debt, to sue out all
the necessary process to enforce the
claim, and for a failure to do so, he is
liable to the client: Croaker v. Hutchinson (1824), 2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 17;
Mc Williams v. Hopkins (1834), 4
Rawle (Pa.) 382; Fitch y. Scott (1839),

3 How. (Miss.) 314; WVikrht v. Ligon
(x824), Harp. Eq.(S.C.)x 37; Smallwood
v. Norton (1841), 20 Me. 83; Cox v. Sullivan (1849), 7 Ga. 144.
In Pennington v. Kell (1850). 11
Ark. 212, a leading case on the liability
of the attorney, the Court say: " As
authority and duty, in the relation of
client and attorney, are correlative terms,
in the same sense that right and obligation are so, in a general sense, it results
from the law, as it now stands, that,
when an attorney undertakes the collection of a debt, it becomes his duty to
sue out all process, both mesne and
final, necessary to effect, that object;
and consequently that he must not only

sue out the first process of execution,
but all such that may become necessary.
This undoubtedly is the true general
doctrine on this subject, qualified, however, as will be presently seen, by a
pervading principle that fairly grows out
of the peculiar character of the attorney's functions. But although it is his
duty thus to pursue his client's cause
through all its stages, he is not imperiously bound to institute new collateral
suits, without special instructions to do
so-as actions against the sheriff, or
clerk, for the failure of their duty in the
He
issuance or service of process.
should pursue bail, however, and those
who may have become bound with the
defendant, either before or after judgment, in the progress of the suit. Nor
is he bound to attend in person to the
levy of an execution, cr to search out
for property, out of which to make the
debt; this is the business of the sheriff.
Nor is he liable for any of the shortcomings of that offier. But, in reference to all these professional duties, the
courts have recognized a principle to
which we have already alluded, that
does not, by any means, move the line
and
between reasonable diligence
crassa negligentia, and thus in fact
place the attorney further from responsibility to his client; but so far as
its operation is in any sort to his protection, it is so only by its influence upon
the determination of the question of fact,
whether or not the act, or omission, complained of, did really amount to that
degree of crassitude for which the law
holds him liable. The principle is, that
the attorney will always be justified in
ceasing to proceed with his client's
cause (unless specially instructed to go
on) whenever he shall be bona fide influenced to this course by a prudent
regard for the interest of his client:
Crooker v. Hutchinson (x824), 2 D.
145.
Chip. (Vt.) 117; 2 Green]. Ev.,
This principle would seem to grow
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directly out of the peculiar character

from him, without negligence on his

of the functions of an attorney-at-law,
and to be founded on sound public
policy. For, in the nature of things,
these duties cannot in general be performed in a manner to subserve the
true interest of the client, if limited to
that strict line of routine conduct which
is chalked out by the law as the pathway for ordinary agents, and it is therefore inevitable that, in the discharge of

part: Hilly. Barney (1848), I8 N. H.
607.
He is not guilty of negligence in forbearing to bring a suit, where the parties
had agreed to leave one of the matters
in dispute to arbitration, the decision of
which would render an action unnecessary: Hogg v. Aartin (1835), Riley
(S. C.) 156; nor in failing to pursue
the extraordinary remedy of attachment, the owner of the claim having
neither made affidavit nor given bond:
Foulks v. Falls (1883), 91 Ind. 315;
nor for omitting to defend a suit, if not
instructed in the defence: Benton v.
Craig (1830), 2 Mo. 198; nor is he
liable for a failure to file a note, which
he has received for collection by suit, as
a claim against the estate of the maker,
upon the death and declaration of the
insolvency of the estate of the latter,
when said facts occurred after he received the note and without his knowledge: Stubbs v. Beene (186I), 37 Ala.
627. 'Where an attorney is directed to
collect a note containing no waiver of
the appraisement laws, and obtains a
judgment with such waiver, the client
cannot complain, although the debtor's
property sold for much less than its
value, and the whole amount of the
judgment was not realized: Nickless v.
Pearson (1882), 81 Ind. 427. Where
a demand against persons known to be
insolvent, was left with an attorney, with
instructions to do the best he could with
it, and he received the notes of third
persons for the debt, but, in consequence
of the fraud of the debtors, such notes
were not collected, it was held that he
was not responsible fo. the loss: Wright
v. Ligon (1824), 1 Harp. Eq. (S. C.)
137.

these duties, they must be intrusted with
a large and liberal share of discretion."
So, an attorney is liable for a failure
to seasonably sue out a scire facias
where the execution has been returned
non est inventus.: Dearbornv. Dearborn (I818), 15 Mass. 316; for not delivering an execution to the officer
within thirty days after judgment, if an
attachment is lost thereby: Phillls v.
Bridge (1814), Is Id. 242.
Where an attorney employed to prosecute a suit for the recovery of valuable
land, when a jury had returned a verdict
in his .favor, took the same, and by his
negligence and unskillfulness altered the
verdict so as to include only a worthless
piece of the property sought to be recovered, and, at his request, the jury
accepted the same as their verdict, to
the plaintiffs damage, it was held that
hewas liable: Skillenv. Wallace (1871),
36 Ind. 319. 'Where an attorney was
employed to conduct a case in the district court, and a judgment was rendered against his client, and he was
entitled to a new trial, and obtained one,
but conducted the proceedings, in obtaining the new trial, so carelessly and
negligently that the order granting the
same was reversed in the Supreme
Court, it was held that he was liable to
the client for the loss sustained thereby,
and his liability was not destroyed by
the fact that his client employed other
counsel in the Supreme Court: Drais
v. Hogan (1875), 50 Cal. 121. But he
is not liable for the loss of papers stolen

Giving Advice.
An attorney is liable where he gives
to the client plainly erroneous advice,
from which the client, by following, is
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damaged: Gihon v. Albert (x838), 7
Paige (N.Y.) 278.
Neglgence a Question of Fact.
Whether the conduct of an attorney
in a particular case, is or is not gross

negligence, is a question to be determined in each case by the jury, on the
evidence: Walker v. Goodman (1852),
21 Ala. 647; Penningtonv. Yell (i85o),
I Ark. 212; Dearborn v. Deatrborn
(1818), 15 Mass. 316; IJ'aldpole v.
Carlisle (1869), 32 Ind. 415.
In California, however, the facts being
ascertained, the question of negligence
is one of law for the Court: Gambert
v. Hart (1872), 44 Cal. 542.

Failureto Follow Instructions.
The attorney must follow the instructions of his client. "Whenever an attorney disobeys the lawful instructions
of his client, and a loss ensues, for that
loss the attorney is responsible :" Gilbert v. Williams (18t1), 8 Mass. 51;
Nare v. Baird (1859), 12 Ind. 318;
Wileox v. Plummer (1830), 4 Pet. (29
U. S.) 172; Coxv. Livingston (1841),
2 V. & S. (Pa.) 103; Armstrong v.
Crai. (1854), r8 Barb. (N. Y.) 387.
Thus, where the holder of a note
places it in the hands of an attorney and
instructs him to bring suit on it, but the
attorney honestly believing that it would
be better not to sue then, omits to do
so, and the money is lost by the maker's
subsequent insolvency, the attorney is
liable to an action by the client: Cox v.
Livingston (1841), 2 W. & S. (Pa.)
103.

As to the general conduct of the suit,
the attorney acts according to his judgment and discretion; in these matters
the client has no right to control him;
he may do what he thinks is proper,
even though against the wishes of the
client: Anonymous (1828), x Wend.

(N. Y.) io8; Read v. French (1863),
28 N. Y. 285.

SPecial 4greements.
Where the plaintiff handed to certain attorneys claims against a bankrupt,
"to file against the estate and to obtain
any dividend that he may be allowed
on the same," it was held that this did
not show a special contract to resist the
bankrupt's discharge, and that the attorneys were entitled to use their discretion in withdrawing such resistance:
Bennett v. Phillips (1881), 57 Iowa
174. A contract by an attorney, to
save his client harmless from all responsibility in a suit pending against him, or
to refund his fee, conceding it to be
valid, extends only to such liabilities as
the law would recognize or enforce;
and if the client suffers a judgment to
be rendered against him, in favor of
another attorney, whom he never had
employed for professional services in the
same suit, he cannot resort to his contract of indemnity: Lindsey v. Jones
(1853), 23 Ala. 835.
Liability for Mistakes or Frauds of
Agents or 4ssoeciates.
An attorney is liable for the negligence or fraud of another attorney whom
he employs as his agent: Riddle v.
Poorman (1831), 3 R- &%V.(Pa.) 224;
Poole v. Gist (1827), 4 McCord (S. C.)

259; Walkerv. Sterrns (1875), 79111.
193 ; Smallwo,.d v. Norton (1841), 20Me. 83; Pollard v. Rowland (1826),
2 Blackf. (Ind.) 22; Grayson v. W1ilhinson (1845), 5 S. & M. (Miss.) 268;
Bi'beck v. Stafford (1862), 14 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.) 285; Cummins v. Heald'
(188o), 24 Kan. 6oo.
So, each partner in a firm of attorneys, is liable for the want of skill or
negligence of the others: Livinston v.
Cox (1847), 6 Pa. 36o; Dw,ht v.
Simon (1849), 4 La. An. 490; Poole
v. Gist (1827), 4 McCord (S. C.) 259:
Wilkinson v. Griswold (1845), 12 S. &
M. (Miss.) 669.
For like reasons,, a mercantile col-
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lecting agency, receiving a note "for
be paid over to King and Baird.'
collection," is liable for the negligence
Across the face of the receipt was printed
of attorneys or agents employed by them
these words: 'N. B. The owner of
in other parts of the country. In Brad- the within mentioned, taking all the
street v. Everson (1872), 72 Pa. 124,
risks of the mail, of losses by failure of
AGNEW, J., said: "It is argued, not- agents to remit, and also of losses by
withstanding the express receipt ' for
reason of insurrection or war.' The
collection,' that the defendants did not limitation of the liability of Bullitt &
undertake for themselves to collect, but
Fairthorn, by Mr. Bullitt, himself a good
only to remit to a proper and responsible
lawyer, is evidence of his belief that a
attorney, and made themselves liable
greater liability would arise without the
only for diligence in correspondence,
restriction."
and giving the necessary information to
[This was affirmed in 11organ v.
the plaintiffs; or, in briefer terms, that
Tener (1877), 81 Pa. 305.
the attorney in Memphis was not their
An attorney, who has collected money
agent for the collection, but that of the
for his client, will, if he deliver it to a
plaintiffs only. The current of decision,
third person to carry to his client, withhowever, is otherwise, as to attorneys-atout authority, or directions, from the
law sending claims to correspondents
client to do so, be liable to his client for
for collection, and the reasons for applythe sum thus collected, if the same be
ing the same rule to collection agencies
stolen from such third person while on
are even stronger. They have their se- his way with the money, even though
lected agents in every part of the counsuch person were trustworthy and took
try. From the nature of such ramified
the same care of the money that he did
institutions we must conclude that the
of his own: Grayson v. Wilkinson
public impression will be, that the agency
(1845), 5 S. & M. (Miss.) 268. But
invited customers on the very ground of where an attorney directed by a mortits facilities for making distant conRecgagee of certain horses and harness, to
tions. It must be presumed from its
take possession of them under the mortbusiness connections at remote points,
gage, went with an officer to the stable
and its knowledge of the agents chosen,
where they were and took possession of
the agency intends to undertake the
them, and the stable was then leased
performance of the service which the
from the mortgagor and a custodian seindividual customer is unable to perform
lected by the mortgagee was placed in
for himself. There is good reason,
charge of the property, it was held that
therefore, to hold that such an agency
the attorney was not liable for the cusis liable for collections made by its own
todian's neglect in permitting the propagents, when it undertakes the collection
erty to be afterwards seized under an
by the express terms of the receipt. If execution: Gaines v. Becker k1880), 7
it does not so intend, it has it in its
Bradw. (IlI.)
power to limit responsibility by the terms
Acting Without Authority.
of the receipt. An example of this
limited liability is found in the case of
If an attorney commence, or defend,
.Bullitt v. Baird (infra), decided at an action, or suit, without authority, he
Philadelphia in 1870; the only case in
is liable to the principal for damages:
this State upon the subject of such agenGilbertv. Williams (18 11), 8 Mass. 31 ;
Cyphert v. McClune (1853), 22 Pa.
cies. There the receipt read, ' For
collection according to our direction,
195; O'Hara v. Bro~hy (1863), 24
and -proceeds, when received by us, to
How. Prac. (N. Y.) 379; Piggott v.
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23 Cal. 127; Quin v. Weatherbee
(1871),41 Id. 247; Dibblev. Truluck
(1868), 12 Fla. 185; Burton v. Wiley
(1854), 26 Vt. 430; Farmers' Co. v.
Wdworth Bk. (1868), 23 Wis. 249;
Burton v. Hynson (1853), 14 Ark. 32;
Austin v. Nelson (z877), ii Mo. 192;
Kerby v. Chadwell(1847), xo Id. 392;
Gehrke v.Jod (1875), 59 Id. 522; Bieinger v. Taylor (1876), 64 Id. 63;
Spaulding v. Thompson (1859),12 Ind.
477; Merritt v. Putnam (1862), 7
Minn. 493; Babcock v. Brown (1853),
25 Vt. 550; Jones v. Leech (1877), 46
Iowa 186; Matthis v. Cameron(1876),
62 Mo. 504; Niagara Ins. Co. v. Rodecker (1877), 47 Iowa 162.
So, a .party to a suit, cannot plead
the neglect of his counsel as an excuse
for his own negligence, where he is capable of acting in the matter for himself and by himself: Boing v. Raleigh
& G. R. Co. (1883), 88 N. C. 62. In
New York it has been held that a judgment obtained by default through the
neglect of the defendant's attorney,
will be set aside, when it appears that
the attorney is insolvent and the client
otherwise would be remediless: Meacham v. Dudley (1831), 6 Wend. (N.
Y.) 514; Elston v. Schelling (1868), 7
Robt. (Id.) 74; Sharp v. Mayor (186o),
31 Barb. (Id.) 578, and Grillv. Vernon
(1871), 65 N. C. 76.
Measure of Damages.
The client must- have suffered an injury, or he cannot maintain an action,
even for nominal damages: Graysonv.
Wilkinson (1845), 5 S. & M. (Miss.)
268; Suydam v. Vance (184o), U. S.
Cir.Ct.,Dist. Ind., 2 McLean 99; Harter
v. Morris (1869), x8 Ohio 492; Arwold v. Robertson (1870), 3 Daly (N.
Y.) 298; Bruce v. Baxter (1881), 7
Lea (Tenn.) 477.
"Two things are to be shown in
order to subject an attorney to an action : (1) Gross or unreasonable negVOL. XXXVII.-35

ligence or ignorance, and (2) A consequent loss to his client:" Fitch v.
Scott (1839), 3 How. (Miss.) 314.
The measure of damages is the actual loss sustained: Pennington v.
Yell (1850),

ii

Ark. 212; Stevensv.

Walker (1870), 55 Ill. 151; Rootes
v. Stone (1831), 2 Lea (Tenn.) 650;
Crooker v. Hutchinson (1824), 2 D.
Chip. (Vt.) 117; Nisbet v. Lawson
(1846), I Ga. 275; Cox v. Sullivan

(1849), 7 Id. 144; Mfardis v. Shackleford (1842), 4 Ala. 493; Eccles v. Steohenson (1814), 3 Bibb (Ky.) 517;
Arnold v. Robinson (870), 3 Daly
(N. Y.) 298; Sitydam v. Vance (1840),
U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Ind., 2 McLean
99; Grayson v. Wilkinson (1845), .
S. & l. (Miss.) 268; Langmade v.
Glenn (1876), 57 Ga. 525. It is not
necessarily the amount of the claim
which was not recovered through the
negligence of the attorney: Eccles
v. Stephenson, Crooker v. Hutchinson,
Cox v. Sullivan, just cited. The client
must show that he had a valid claim:
SPiller v. Davidson (1849), 4 La. An.
171; Pennington v. Yell (I85O), II
Ark. 212.

An attorney is liable to his client only
for the proximate results of neglect in
making collections. If, after the client
took the business from the bands of the
attorney, loss resulted from further delay
of the client, or of another attorney, into
whose hands the collections were given,
the first attorney cannot be held responsible for such loss: Read v. Patterson
(1883), zz Lea (Tenn.) 43o. An attorney liable for a debt lost by his negligence, is not liable for the loss of the
evidence of the debt, and in a suit
against him for such loss, he may show
that the plaihtiff had another remedy,
which he has successfully pursued:
Huntington v. Rumnill (1809), 3 Day
(Conn.) 39o. The amount of damages
is a question for the jury: Godfrey
v. Jay (183x), 5 Moo. & P. 284;
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Crooker v. Htchinson (1824), 2 D.
Chip. (Vt.) X17; Eccles v. Ste/phenson
(1814), 3 Bibb (Ky.) 517. That the
plaintiff continued to employ him after

BAIRD.

knowing of such negligent conduct, is
evidence on the question of damages:
Derricksonv. Cady (1847), 7 Pa. 27.
JOHN D. LAWSON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BULLITT ET AL v. BAIRD.
Error to the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia.
READ, J., May 5, 1870. The defendants received for collection from King &
Baird, a claim against F. Saler, St. Louis, Missouri, for which they gave a receipt
in these words:"Philadelphia, May 24th, 1862. Received, to be forwarded for collection according to our discretion, and proceeds, when received by us, to be paid over to
King & Baird. Against F. Saler, $3490.12. (Signed) Bullitt & Fairthorne, per
Theo. D. Rand."
Written across the receipt were these words: "N. B. The owner of the within
mentioned taking all risks of the mail, of losses by failure of agents to remit, and
also of losses by reason of insurrection or war." This, it will be recollected, was
during the rebellion, and when Missouri was often made the battle ground.
The claim was duly transmitted for collection to Clark & Allen, attorneys in St.
Louis, who were proved to be proper and suitable persons for the purpose. Correspondence was duly kept up, and as late as June 21st, 1864, Clark & Allen
wrote [that] they had no judgment in King & Baird v. Saler. On the 23d of August, 1864, one of the plaintiffs called and reported he had heard the money had
been collected. Defendants immediately wrote to Clark & Allen, who replied, and
stated the money had been collected, and promising to remit. This was communicated to the plaintiffs, who read the original letter from Clark & Allen. The
defendants received a letter, dated "St. Nicholas Hotel, New York, September
6th, 1864." (This was Tuesday.) "Gentlemen :-I will be in your city this or
the forepart of next week. The claim of King & Baird v. Saler has been paid, i.e.,
compromised. Yours truly, Win. Bliss Clark."
And also another letter, dated "New York, September 13, 1864" (also Tuesday). "Gentlemen :-I will not be in your city before Thursday night. Yours
truly, Wm. Bliss Clark."
He never came, and the next news was that he had fallen dead in the street in
St. Louis, utterly insolvent. The witness could not recollect whether he communicated these letters to the plaintiffs, or not.
The learned Judge, in his charge to the jury, said: "So far as negligence goes,
I do not see anything but this information from New York, which was not communicated. The information that he was in New York, the letters written from
there, and the fact that he did not come, as promised, do not appear to have been
communicated. It is for you to say if there was negligence on the part of defendants in reference to this."
this, therefore, was the only negligence, if any, and the natural question is, if
this information had been communicated, would it have saved the debt due by

STONE V. DRY-DOCK, E. B. & B. RY. CO.

547

Clark & Allen, or any part of it? From what we know, it would probably not have
saved one dollar; and, therefore, the measure of damages stated in the plaintiff's
print, and affirmed by the Court, which is in these words: "And the measure of
damages is the amount received by said Clark, together with interest thereon, from
the date of such receipt, unless reduced by the evidence offered by the defendants,"
is clearly erroneous, and the fourth assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversed and a venire de novo awarded.

Court of Appeals of New York.
STONE v. DRY-DOCK, E. B. & B. RY. CO.
Where a car driver so negligently drives in a city street as to run over a child of
seven years of age, the jury should find whether child was capable of exercising
sufficient judgment so as to be chargeable with contributory negligence.
The Court will decide that a child of very tender years has not sufficient judgment; but, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to prescribe a fixed period
when a child has such sufficient judgment as to be guilty of contributory negligence. A nonsuit, on the ground of contributory negligence, is erroneous, and
judgment below (opinion in 46 Hun. 184) is reversed.

Appeal from the Supreme Court, General Term, First Department. (46 Hun. 184.)
Adolph L. Sawyer, Esq., for appellant.
Messrs. Robinson, Scribner & Bright, for defendant.
ANDREWS, J., June 4,1 889. The nonsuit was placed on the
ground that an infant, seven years of age, was sui juris, and
that the act of the child, in crossing the street in front of the
approaching car, was negligence on her part which contributed

to her death, and barred a recovery. We think the case should
have been submitted to the jury. The negligence of the driver
of the car is conceded. His conduct in driving rapidly along
Canal street at its intersection with Orchard street, without
looking ahead, but with his eyes turned to the inside of the
car, was grossly negligent: Mangam v. R. R. Co. (1868), 38
N. Y. 455 ; R. R. Co. v. Gladmon (1872), 15 Wall. (82 U. S.)
401.

It cannot be asserted, as a proposition of law, that a child,
just passed seven years of age, is sui juris, so as to be chargeable with negligence. The law does not define when a child
becomes sui juris : Kunzv. City of Troy (1887), 1o4 N. Y. 344-
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Infants, under seven years of age, are deemed incapable of
committing crime, and, by the common law, such incapacity
presumptively continues until the age of fourteen. An infant,
between those ages, was regarded as within the age of possible
discretion; but, on a criminal charge against an infant between
those years, the burden was upon the prosecutor to show that
the defendant had intelligence and maturity of judgment sufficient to render him capable of harboring a criminal intent: i
Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. i i. The Penal Code preserves the rule
of the common law, except that it fixes the age of twelve, instead of fourteen, as the time when the presumption of incapacity ceases: Penal Code, §§ i8, 19.
In administering civil remedies, the law does not fix any
arbitrary period when an infant is deemed capable of exercising
judgment and discretion. It has been said in one case that an
infant, three or four years of age, could not be regarded as sui
juris,and the same was said, in another case, of an infant five
years of age: Mangam v. R. R. Co., supra; Fallon v. R. R. Co.
(1876), 64 N. Y. 13. On the other hand, it was said in Cosgrove v. Ogden (1872), 49 N. Y. 255, that a lad, six years of
age, could not be assumed to be incapable of protecting himself from danger in streets or roads; and, in another case, that
a boy of eleven years of age was competent to be trusted in
the streets of a city: MfcMahon v. Mayor (1865), 33 N.Y. 642.
From the nature of the case, it is impossible to prescribe a
fixed period when a child becomes sui juris. Some children
reach the point earlier than others. It depends upon many
things, such as natural capacity, physical conditions, training,
habits of life, and surroundings. These, and other circumstances, may enter into the question. It becomes, therefore, a
question of fact for the jury, where the inquiry is material, unless the child is of so very tender years that the Court can
safely decide the fact.
The trial Court misapprehended, we think, the case of Wendellv. R.R. Co. (1883), 91 N.Y. 420, in supposing that it'decided, as a proposition of law, that a child of seven years was
capable of exercising judgment, so as to be chargeable with
contributory negligence. It was assumed in that case, both
on the trial and on appeal, that the child whose conduct was
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in question was capable of understanding, and did understand,
the peril of the situation, and the evidence placed it beyond
doubt that he recklessly encountered the danger which resulted
in his death. The boy was familiar with the crossing, and,
eluding the flagman, who tried to bar his way, attempted to
run across the track in front of an approaching train in plain
sight, and unfortunately slipped and fell, and was run over and
killed. It appeared that he was a bright, active boy, accus'tomed to go to school and on errands alone, and sometimes
was intrusted with the duty of driving a horse and wagon, and
that on previous occasions he had been stopped by the flagman, while attempting to cross the track in front of an approaching train, and had been warned of the danger. The Court
held, upon this state of facts, that the boy was guilty of culpable negligence. But the case does not decide, as matter of law,
that all children, of the age of seven years, are sui juris.
We are inclined to the opinion that, in an action for an injury
to a child of tender years, based on negligence, who may or
may not have been suijuris when the injury happened, and
the fact is material, as bearing upon the question of contributory negligence, the burden is upon the plaintiff to give some
evidence that the party injured was not capable, as matter of
fact, of exercising judgment and discretion. This rule would
seem to be consistent with the principle, now well settled in
this State, that in an action for a personal injury, based on
negligence, freedom from contributory negligence on the part
of the party injured is an element of the cause of action.
In the present case, the only fact before the jury, bearing
upon the capacity of the child whose death was in question,
was, that she was a girl seven years and three months old.
This, we think, did not alone justify an inference that the child
was incapable of exercising any degree of care. But, assuming
that the child was chargeable with the exercise of some degree
of care, we think it should have been left to the jury to determine whether she acted with that degree of prudence which
might reasonably be expected, under the circumstances, of a
child of her years. This measure of care is all that the law
exacts in such a case: Thurber v. R. R. Co. (1875), 6o N. Y.
335. The child was lawfully in the street. In attempting to
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cross, she was struck by the horse on the defendant's car, and
was run over and killed. The evidence would have justified
the jury in finding that, when the child stepped down from the
curbstone, the car was fifty or more feet away, and the distance
from the curbstone to the track of the defendant's road was
less than twelve feet. The child, if she saw the car, might
very well have supposed that she could get over the track before the car passed. There is evidence that the speed of the
car was increased at about the time the child started to cross.
It would be very unjust to exact of such a child that degree of
care which an adult would exercise under similar circumstances. It was, we think, for the jury to say whether the
child's conduct was unusual or unnatural for a child of her
years. She probably did not appreciate the rapidity of movement of the car; nor could it be expected that she would weigh
the circumstances, or fully understand the danger of attempting to cross in front of the car. The negligence of the defendant's driver is conceded, and it was for the jury to judge
whether the conduct of the child, in crossing the street to join
another child, engaged in roller-skating on the opposite side,
was characterized by any want of that degree of care which
children under similar circumstances would usually exercise.
There is no question in the case, of negligence on the part of
the parent of the child. That point was not presented on the
motion for nonsuit. The judgment should be reversed, and a
new trial granted.
All concur.
The right of children to play on the
sidewalk and street, is not settled.
It is nowhere disputed that children
sui juris have as much right on the
sidewalks and streets as adults, and the
same may be said of children ncn sui
juris, in ch.rge of a proper person.
But the right to use the sidewalks and
street for the purpose of travel is quite
different from the use for the purpose
of play.

between children suijurisand children
non sui uris.
In cases of injury to children non
siijuris,the doctrine of imputable negligence has, in some jurisdictions, been
applied. In cases of injury to children suijuris, some courts have applied this doctrine, and others have applied the rule of contributory negligence, without regard to the doctrine of
imputable negligence.

A careful analysis of the decisions
will exhibit that there is a dibtinLtion

It is proposed to establish the proposition, that all children, suijurisor non
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suijuris,have the right to play on the
sidewalk and street, and if injury to
them can be avoided by the exercise of
due care, such care must be used, and
for want of such care the defendant is
liable, whether there was, or was not,
imputable negligence, or contributory
negligence.
The first obstacle to this proposition
is the doctrine of imputable negligence;
which is, that a child non suijuri
has no right on the sidewalk, or street,
unaccompanied by a proper person.
This was first announced in Harfleld
v. RoPer (1839), 21 Wend. (N. V.)
615. From the reasoning in this case,
and others which follow it, especially
Alangayn v. R. R. (1868), 38 N. Y.
455, this doctrine is properly limited
to children of "two or three years of
age, or even more," who are, what may
be termed, helpless, and require the
care and protection of another. To
this class the doctrine of .[a; eld v.
RoAer is, that if run down or injured
by a traveler, the traveler is not liable,
because it was negligence in the parent
for a child of this age to be on the
street, and it made no difference how
the child got on the street alone, it
being sufficient that he was there.
In other words, a child of "two or
three years or even more" on the street
alone, can be run down or injured with
impunity.
Now it is conceded by the courts
which enforce this doctrine that a child
of these years is devoid of all sense of
danger; and yet the same courts approve the principle that an animal must
not be thus run down, or injured, if it
can be avoided by the exercise of due
care. This is the law of Davies v.
Mann (1842), 10 M. & NV. 546 [a
donkey case] ; Mayor of Colchester v.
Brooke (1845), 7 A. & E. (N. S.) 377
[an oyster case]; Townsend v. I Vathen
(18o8), 9 East 277 [a dog case].
Logically, the syllogism is, that all

beings and animals devoid of the sense
of danger must not be injured, if it can
be avoided by the exercise of due care.
A child of two or three years of age is
such a being, therefore, such a child
must not be injured, if it can be avoided
by the exercise of due care. The logic
of the doctrine in Har~feld v. Rober
is that a child, devoid of the sense of
danger, can be run down without the
exercise of due care. This doctrine is
therefore illogical, and barbarous, and
the proper principle is that such a child
must not be injured, if it can be avoided
by the exercise of due care; which is
the same as stating the general and sensible rule that a defendant is liable for
any injury caused by his want of due
care.
The senseless judicial jugglery of
HarfFldv.Roperobtains in nine States
of the UnionCalifornia,-SchierholM v. R. R.
(1871), 40 Cal. 447; Meeks v. R. R.
(1878), 52 Id. 602; s. c. (188o), 56
Id. 513.
Illinois,--Gavin v. Chicago (188o),
97 I1. 66; Toledo, W. & W. R'y Co.
v. Grable(1878), 88 Id. 441 ; [City of
Chicago v. Starr (1866), 42 Id. 174,
repudiated in City of Chicago v. Keefe
(1885), 114 Id. 222; Stafford v. Reubens (1885), 115 Id. 196; City of Chicagov. Zesing(1876),83 Id. 204; Aerr
v. Fogue (1870),54 Id. 482; Chicago,
St. L. &' P. R. R. Co. v. Welsh (1886),
118 Id. 572.]
Indiana,-Evansville6- C. R. R. Co.
v. 1I'olf (1877), 59 Ind. 89; J .Af
& Ind. R. R. Co. v. Bioen (1872), 40
Id. 545 ; [City of Indianapolisv. Emmelnan (t8S6), lO8 Id. 530; AlaYhew
v. Burns (1885), 103 Id. 328.]
Kansas,-Atch. T. &' S. F. R. R. Co.
v. Smith (1882), 28 Kan. 541.
N. A. R'y
Maine,-Brown v. E.
Co. (1870), 58 Me. 384; Leslie v. City
of Leoiston (1873), 62 Id. 4 6S; [Stin-
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son v. City of Gardner (1856), 42 Id.
248; McCarthy v. City of Portland
(878), 67 Id.167.]
Maryland,-MlcMahon v. R.R. Co.
(1873), 39 Md. 438; Baltimore C. P.
R'y Co. v. 1cDonnell (1875), 43 Id.
551.
Massachusetts,- Lynch v. Smith
(1870), 104 Mass. 52; Gibbons v. Wil.
liaas(i883), 35 Id. 333; [Collins v.
S. B.H. .R. Co. (1886), 42 Id. 301;
Blodgett v. City of Boston (1864), 8
Allen (Mass.) 237; Tghe v. City of
Lowell (1876), 119 Mass. 472; LJons
v. Inhab. Brookline (1876), Id. 491;
Hunt v. City of Salem (1876), 121 Id.
294.1

Minnesota,-Fitzgerald v. R. R. Co.
(1882), 29 Minn. 336.
New York-Ihl v. R. R. Co. (1872),
47 N.Y. 323 ;wCosgrove v. Ogden (1872),
49 Id. 255; [Kunz v. City of Troy
(1887), 104 Id. 344;
I'cGarry v.
Loomis (1875), 63 Id. io4; MeGuire
v. Spence (1883),

91 Id.

303, 306;

O'Mara v. R. R. Co. (1868), 38 Id.
445; Mangant v. R. R. Co."(1868), 38
Id. 455: Fallon v. R. R. Co. (1876), 64
Id. 13; Barry v. R. R. Co. (1883), 92
Id. 289; Thurberv. R. R. Co. (1875),
60 Id. 326; Mtllany v. Spence (1874),
15 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y') 319; Pendergastv. R.R. Co. (1874),58 N.Y. 652;
Ryder v. The Mayor (1884), 50 N. Y.

Super. 221; Birkett v. Ice Co. (:888),
110 N-Y. 504; Malone v. R. R. Co.
(889), 5 Hun (N. V.) 532; Murphy
v. Orr(1884), 96 N.Y. 14; Barker v.
Savage (1871), 45 Id. I91 ; mel v.
Dry Dock, E. B. &" B. R. Co., S. Ct.
N. Y. City, General Term, June 28,
1889; Henderson v. Knikerbocker I.
Co., S. Ct., General Term, Ist Dept.,
May 24, 1889.]
The doctrine of Hartfield v. Roper
has been repudiated in ten States of the
Union:Alabama,-Govrnment S. R. R. Co.
v. Hanlon (1875), 53 Ala. 70; Bay

Shore R. R. Co. v.. Harris (8 O), 67
Id. 6.
Connecticut,-Bronson v. Town of
Southburg(x87°), 3 7 Conn. 199; Birge
v. Gardiner(1849), 19 Id. 507Missouri,-Frickv. R. R. Co. (1882),
75 Mo. 542; [Donahoe v. R. R. Co.
(1884), 83 Id. 543Nebraska,-Huf v. Ames (1884), 16
Neb. 139.
Ohio,-Bellefontaine &- I R. R. Co.
v. Snyder(x868), 18 Ohio St. 399; C.C.
C. &- I R. R. Co. v. Manson (876),
30 Id. 451; Street Ry. Co. v. Eadie
(1885), 43 Id. 91.
Pennsylvania,-N. Pa. R. R. Co. v.
Mahoney (1868), 57 Pa. 187; P.&6'R.
R. R. Co. v. Long (1874), 75 Id. 257.
Tennessee,-[hirley v. Whiteman
(1858), 1 Head (Tenn.) 61o.
Texas,-G. H. 6- H. Ry. Co. v.
Moore (1883), 59 Tex. 64; T. OL Ry.
Co. - Af. N. C. Co. v. Herbeck (1884),
6o Id. 602.
Vermont,-Robinson v. Cone (1850),
22 Vt. 213.

Virginia,-Norfolk 6- P. R. R. Co.
v. Ormsby (1876), 27 Grat. (Va.) 455.
In the jurisdictions which assumed to
adopt the rule in Harqfleld v. RoiPer,
subsequent decisions have so materially
limited the doctrine that there does not
seem to be much of it left.
In MfcGarry v. Loomis (1875), 63
N. Y. 104, it was announced that the
doctrine of imputable negligence does
not apply, if the child has not been
negligent, and that children have a right
to play on the sidewalk. In this case
the defendant was held liable, because
he was guilty of negligence in causing
a pool of hot water, near the sidewalk,
and so liable, irrespective of the question
whether or not the parent was negligent
in allowing a child, four years of age, to
play on the sidewalk, knowing the existence of the pool of hot water, and that
the child having the right to play on the
sidewalk, it was not negligence to play
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near a pool of water, because of its age
it was not sensible of the danger. This
case is therefore nothing more than the
assertion of the major premise above
stated, that a defendant is liable for injury to children devoid of the sense of
danger, when that injury is caused by
the defendant's want of due care, and
that it was a want of due care to cause
a pool of hot water near ar sidewalk.
As will be hereafter shown, this is the
doctrine pervading the adjudications in
cases of injuries to children occurring
elsewhere than on the sidewalk. "This
principle was approved and adopted in
.McGuire v. Spence (1883), 91 N. Y.
306; O'Mara v. R. R. (1868), 38 Id.
445; Mangam v. R. R. (1868), 38 Id.
455; Falonv. R.R. (1876),64 Id. 13;
Barry v. R. R. (1883), 92 Id. 289;
Thurberv.R.R. Co. (1875), 6o Id. 326;
Mullany v. Sjpence (1874), 5 Abb. Pr.
N.S. (N.Y.) 319; Pendergastv.R. R.
(1874), 58 N. Y. 652; Ryder v. The
Mayor (1884), 50 N. Y. Super. 221;
Birkett v. Ice Co. (1888), i1O N. Y.
504.

But, to be more specific, it has been
held that in an action for injury to a
child non suijuris (and, a joriori, injury
causing death), the defendant was held
liable, because the engineer did not stop
the train, or check its speed, upon notice
of the danger to the child, which due
care required, and which would have
avoided the injury: Donahue v. R. R.
(1884), 83 Mo. 543; Phila. &1R. R. R.
Co. v. Long (1874), 75 P- 257.
Because the defendant left water-pipe
piled up in the street, so loose that the
child, while playing upon them, was
killed: Stafford v. Reubens (1885), 115
Ill.i96. Because the defendant caused
a ditch near the sidewalk, into which
the child fell and was drowned: Chicago v. Hesing, 83 Ill. 2o4. Because
the defendant did not remove, as was
its duty, a large, heavy counter, placed
on the sidewalk, tilted in such a manner

as to be easily thrown down: Kunz v.
City of Troy (1887), 104 N. Y. 344.
In this case the Court stated that a
child non sui juriscannot be guilty of
negligence, and that sui jurs means of
sufficient discretion to understand the
danger. The defendant was liable because he put the counter on the street,
which caused the injury, although it
would not have fallen had the child not
attempted to jump on it: .errv. Forgue
(1870), 54 Ill. 482.
Because the driver of the street car
was not watching for pedestrians, which
was his duty: Alv. R. R. (1872), 47
N. Y. 317. Because the driver could
have stopped the car in time to prevent
the injury, had he been on the lookout,
as was his duty: Thurber v. R. R. Co.
(1875),6oId. 326. Because the driver
was not sufficiently vigilant and careful,
for, if he had been, "he would have
seen the child in time to avoid injuring
her": Birkett v. Ice Co. (1888), 1io
N. Y. 5o4.

Because the city left the excavation
unguarded and unfenced: Ryder v.
The Mfayor (1884), 50 N.Y. Super. 221.
Because the city did not keep the
sidewalk in a reasonably safe state of
repair: City of Chicagov. Keefe (1885),
114 II. 222, which repudiates City of
Chicago v. Starr (1866), 42 Id. 174
The converse of the position of the
foregoing cases is illustrated by the following, where it was held that the defendant was not liable because he committed no negligence, or rather omitted
no duty, inasmuch as the child would
not have been drowned had the plaintiff
repaired, or caused to be repaired, or
guarded, the excavation of which he
had full notice: AIlayhew v. Burns
(1885), 103 Ind. 343. Because the defendant was carrying on its own business
upon its own property without the omission of any duty, and thus had no reason
to apprehend that a child, three and
one-half years of age, would come up on
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its track, in such a place, and in front
of a slowly moving freight: Afalone v.
R. R. (1889), 51 Hun (N. Y.) 532.
Because the fault rested with those who
bad charge of the child, and the defendant was without fault: The Burgundia
(1886), U. S. D. Ct., S. Dist. N. Y., 29
Fed. Repr. 464.
This is the principle upon which all
the cases are based, except in Massachusetts and Maine, in cases against municipal corporations, because their liability is
limited by statute: Blodgett v. City of
Boston (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.) 237;
Stinson v. City of Gardiner (1856), 42
Me. 248; McCarthyv.City of Portland
(1878), 67 Id. 167; Tighe v. City of
Lowl (1876), 1i' Mass. .472; Lyons
v. Inhab. Brooaline (1876), Id. 491;
Hunt v. City of Salem (1876), 121 Id.
294; yet the New Hampshire Court,
under a similar law, criticises the principle sought to be applied by these
cases: Varney v. Manchestet (1878),
58 N. H. 430,434.

No adjudication discovered by the
writer, after a laborious research, has
announced any rule or principle, by
which the right of children to be and
to play upon the sidewalk and street, is
governed or controlled. The majority
of the cases have gone off on the minor,
or subsidiary question, of whether or
not the parent has been guilty of negligence; and others, upon the question
whether or not the child, though non
suijuris,has been guilty of negligence;
while the minority of the cases place
the ruling upon the principle contended
for, yet, through all the cases, may be
found the proposition that, with respect
to children under the age of adult discretion, the defendant should be held
liable, if he has failed in any duty.
The rule announced is enforced by the
application of fundamental principles:
First. The sidewalk and street is for
the use of all person, children as well
as adults, as a matter of right.

Second. In the exercise of one's own
right, he must take due care not to interfere with the rights of others, and if
he uses any agency or power in the
exercise of this right, such as driving a
horse, he must use the vigilance and
care commensurate with the agency
employed, and is therefore liable for any
interference with another's right, if it
could be avoided by the exercise of due
care: Muriphy v. Orr (1884), 96 N.Y.
14; Barker v. Savage (187), 45 Id.
191.

Third. Children are required to exercise only such care and prudence as
may reasonably be expected from their
age and the circumstances of the case;
the question being, did the child'have
the capacity to properly anticipate the
danger and guard against it, the defendant being without fault; which is nothing more than the rule in Lynch v.
Nrurdin (1841), 1 A. & E. (N. S.) 29;

R. R. Co. v. Stout (1873), 17 Vall. (84
U. S.) 657 ; Gray v. Scott (1870), 66 Pa.
345; Robinson v. Cone (1850), 22 Vt.
21 3 ; Lynch v. Smith (x870), 104 Mass.
52; Zkhdligan v. Curtis (1868), loo Id.

512; Hicks v.R. R. Co. (1877),64 Mo.
430; R. R. Co. v. Gladman (1872), 15

Wall. (82 U. S.) 4o; Kay v. R. R. Co.
(1870), 65 Pa. 269; Afanly v. R. R.
(1876), 74 N. C. 655; Alobile & .
By. Co. v. Crenshaw (I88O), 65 Ala.
566; Parryv. R. R. Co. (1883), 92 N.
Y. 289; Byrne v. R. R. Co. (I881),83
N. Y. 620; Houston &- T. C. Ry. Co.

v. SimPson (1883), 6o Tex. io3; G.H
H". Ry. Co. v. Moore (i883), 59 Tex.
64; Plumley v. Birge (1878), 124
Mass. 57; Afeibus v. Dodge (1875), 38
Wis. 300; Chicago .' N. W Ry. Co.
v. Smith (1881), 46 Mich. 504.

Fourth. Parents are required to exercise such care as the circumstances of
the case and their circumstances in life
permit, which, being a question of fact,
is for the jury: Isabel v. R. R. Co.
(1875), 60 Mo. 475; Walters v. R. R.
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a. (x875), 41 Iowa 71 ; Pittsburg, .4.
&AAT. Ry. Co. v. Pearson (1872), 72
Pa. 169; P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Long
(1874), 75 Id. 257; Glassy v. R.R.
Co. (x868), 57 Id. 172; O'Flaherty v.
R. R. Co. (1869), 45 Mo. 70; A'as, V.
R. R. Co. (x870), 65 Pa. 269.
F6?h. A higher degree of care must
be exercised towards children, than towards adults: P. 6 ?. R. R. Co. v.
Sparen (1864), 47 Pa. 300; Smith v.
O'Connor(1864), 48 Id. 218; P.R.
R. Co. v. Aforgan (1876), 82 Id. 134;
Isabelv. R. R. Co. (1875), 6o Mo. 475 ;
C.B. &- Q. R. R. Co. v. Dewey (1861),
26 III. 259; Bannon v. R. R. Co.
(1865), 24 Md. lo8; Walters v. R. R.
Co. (187), 41 Iowa 71; O'Alara v.
R. R. Co. (1868), 38 N. Y. 445; Singleton v. Ry. Co. (859), 7 C. B. (N. S.)
287. Because an adult has legal descretion and a child has not; hence due
care means the degree of care in proportion to the capacity of the child to
anticipate the danger and guard against
it; and therefore, due care as to adults,
would be gross negligence as to children: Robinson v. Cone (1850), 22 Vt.
213; PittsburgA. 6- Of R. R. Co. v.
Caldwel (1873), 74 Pa. 421; Lucas,
Addm'r, v. R?. R. Co. (1856), 6 Gray
(Mass.) 71 ;.Kerr v. Fore (1870),54
Ill. 484; Brannonv. R. A?. Co. (1877),
45 Conn. 284; Walters v. A?. R. Co.
(1875), 41 Iowa 71; East Saginaw
Ry. Co. v. .Bohn (I873), 27 Mich. 503;
Kenyon v. R. R. Co. (1875), 5 Hun (N.
Y.) 479; T. &" P. Ry. Co. v.O'Donnel
(1882), 58 Tex.27; G. C.&' S.F.Ry.
Co. v. Evansich (1884), 61 Id. 3.
Now if children, sui juris or non
suijuris,have a right on the sidewalk
and street (and the. adjudications have
modified Har66feld v. Roper to this extent: AtcGarry v. Loomis (1875), 63
N. Y. io4; Karr v. Parks (1879), 40
Cal. 188; Alangam v. R. R. Co. (1868),
38 N.Y. 455; Jetterv.R.R. Co. (1866),
2 Keyes (N. Y.) 154; O'Flaherty v.

A?. R. Co. (1869), 45 Mo. 70; Cosgrove
v. Ogden (1872), 49 N. Y. 255; Schierhoedv. R. R?.Co. (187), 40 Cal. 447;
Drew v. R. R. Co. (1862), 26 N. Y. 49;
Lynch v. Smith (1870), 104 Mass. 52;
Ihlv. R. R. Co. (1872), 47 N. Y. 3 17;
East Saginaw Ry. Co. v. Bohn (1873),
27 Mich. 503; Bellefontaine & I. R.
R. Co. v. Snyder (1868), 18 Ohio St.
399; MehAahon v. R. R. Co. (1873), 39
Md. 438; Afulligan v. Curtis (1868),
100 Mass. 512); then it is immaterial
whether the child is there through the
negligence of the parents or not. Being
on the sidewalk by right, and only required to exercise the care commensurate with its age and descretion, and the
defendant compelled to exercise a higher
degree of care towards children than to
adults, it follows that, as to children devoid of the sense of danger, or incapable of anticipating danger and guarding
against it, there can be no contributory
negligence, and the rule is that the defendant is liable, if he could have
avoided the injury by the exercise ofdue
care. This the courts have asserted in
modification of the rule (in Harofeldv.
RoPer): Baltimore C. P. Ay. Co. v.
ilfcDonnell (1875), 43 Md. 556; Ac.Aahon v. A?. A?. (1873), 39 Id. 439;
Barksdull v. A?.R. Co. (1871), 23 La.
An. I8o, which is substantially the rule
in Davies v. Alann (1842), 10 M. &
W. 546, that if a traveler can, by the
exercise of ordinary care, avoid doing
an injury to something exposed in the
highway, he is bound to do it. If such
a child is injured, notwithstanding the
exercise of due care on the part of the
defendant, then there is no cause of action. The child did not contribute, because it was incapable of contributing;
the defendant is not liable, because he
committed no breach of duty.
In such cases, the sole question is, did
the defendant fail to exercise due care?
and this the weight of the authorities
approve: Robinson v. Cone (1850), 22
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Vt. 213; X P. R. R. Co. v. Alakony
(1868), 57 Pa. 187; P. R. R. Co. v.
Kelly (1858), 31 Id. 372; Ranch v.
Lloyd (1858), Id. 358; P. & R. R.
R. Co. v. Spearen (x864) , 47 Id. 300;
Smith v. Connor (1864), 48 Id. 218;
Glassey v.R. R. Co. (1868), 57 Id. 172;
A'ay v. R.R. Co. (t87o), 65 Id. 269;

P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Long (1874), 75
Id. 257; Gov. S. R. R. Co. v. Han/on
(x875), 53 Ala. 70; Bellefontaine & L
R. R. Co. v-Vnyder (x868), x8 Ohio St.
399; C. C. C. &-' . R. R. Co. v. Manson (1876), 30 Id. 451; Norfolk &P. R. R. Co. v. Ormsby (1876), 27
Grat. (Va.) 455; .Rirge v. Gardner
(1849), 19 Conn. 507; Daley v. R. R.
(x858), 26 Id. 591 ; Bronson v. Town
of Southbury (1870),

37 Id.

199;

Boland v. R. R. Co. (1865), 36 Mo.
484; Stils/on v. R. R. Co. (1878), 67
Id. 671; Frick v. R. R. Co. (1882), 75
Id. 542; Huff v.Ames(1884), 16 Neb.
139; Whirley v. Whileman (1858), 1
Head (Tenn.) 61o; G. H &H. Ry. Co.
v. Moore (1883), 59 Tex. 64; . 6- P.
Ry. Co.v. O'Donnell(i882),58 Id. 27;
H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Simpson (1883),
6o Id. 1o3 ; T. M. Ry. Co. et al. v.
Herbeck (1884), 6o Id. 602.
According to the adjudications, this
rule does not apply to children injured
by the negligence of the parent, while
in the actual custody and control of such
parent: N. P. R. . Co. v. Mahony
(1868), 57 Pa. 187; Holly v. Gas Co.
(1857),8 Gray (Mass.) 123; Pitesburg,
A. & Af. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell (1873),
74Pa. 421; Belleonte &1 R. R. Co.v.
Snyder (1868), I8 Ohio St. 399; East
Saginaw C. Ry. Co. v. Bohn (1873), 27
Mich. 503; S/illsonv. R. R. Co. (1878),
67 Mo. 671; Lannen v. Gas Co. (1865),
46 Barb. (N.Y.) 264; R. R. v. Stratton,
76 I1. 38; Carterv. Towne (x868),98
Mass. 567; Morrison v. R. R. Co.
(1874), 56 N. Y. 302; though it is difficult to understand what inherent reason
can exist for excusing a defendant who

has committed a breach of duty, because the parent was negligent, notwithstanding the injury would not have
occurred had the defendant exercised
due care.
With respect to children sui jur,
the rule in Lynch v. Nurdin, and not
the rule applicable to children non sui
juris, applies, because they are capable
of exercising discretion, and of recognizing danger and providing against it,
but only in proportion to their age and
prudence.
As stated above, a higher degree of
care must be used towards children than
adults, because of the smaller degree of
judgment and discretion possessed by
children; hence, if ordinary care is required with respect to adults, it follows
that extraordinary care must be exercised towards children, and, therefore,
the sole question would be, did the defendant exercise this due care? if he
did not, he should be held liable. If
he did, he is not liable. If, on the one
hand,the child is only required to exercise
the care which may be expected from his
age and intelligence, and, on the other,
the defendant must exercise extraordinary care--or a higher degree of care
than ordinary care-it is difficult to understand why a defend ant who has failed
to exercise the care which the law demands, and thereby caused the injury,
should be exempt from liability, when
a child, capable of exercising childish
care, has failed or forgotten to use that
care. As a matter of reason and nature, the omission of a child to exercise
childish care, ought not to be allowed
to excuse the want of due care in an
adult.
The rule in Lynch v. Nurdin does
not extend "to the question whether, or
not, the child exercised the care expected from one of his age and judgment, but is based entirely upon the
question, Did the defendant exercise
due care? Hence, due care required
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him not to leave his horse and cart unhitched and unattended in the street,
where children might get hurt by playing with or about it: Lynch v. Nurdin
(1841), 1 A. & E. (N. S.)2 9 ; Clark
v. Cham6ers (1878), L. R., 3 Q. B. Div.
327.
And that he do not leave his turntables unguarded and unlocked in a
place likely to attract children, even
upon his own ground: R. R. Co. v.
Stout (1873), 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 657;
s. c. 2 Dill. (U. S. C. Ct., Dist. Neb.)

Fitzsimmons (1879), 22 Kan. 686;
.Koons v. R. R. Co. (1877), 65 Mo. 592.
Nor expose on his premises, or where
children may, or are, likely to resort, or
be attracted, any dangerous tool, or
machine, or contrivance: Stoutv.Sioux
City 6- P. R. R. Co. (1872), U. S. C.
Ct., Dist. Neb., 2 Dill. 294; R. R. Co. v.
Stout (1873), 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 657;
only questioned in St. L. V. & 2. H. R.
R. Co. v. Bell (1876), 8S Ill. 76; McAl in v. Powell (1877), 7o N.Y. 126;
and rejected in Lane v..Atlantic Waorhs
294(1872), 111 Mass. 136; Hughes v.
Nor leave a tilted bulkhead so exposed
1lactie (1863), 2 H. & C. 744; Iangan
on the sidewalk, that a child may throw v. Atterton (1866), L. R. I Ex. 239.
it over and suffer injury: Birgev. GardThis proper rule has been carried so
ner (IS49), i9 Conn. 507.
far that, where children were injured
Nor pile lumber in such a place, and
while playing on a railroad track, the
in such a way, as to fall on children
defendant was held liable if the injury
should they play upon it: Cosgrove v. could have been avoided: Morrissey v.
Ogeden (1872), 49 N.Y. 255; A&VcA-in
R. R. Co. (1879), 126 Mass. 377;
v. Poell (878), 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
Eckert v. R. R. Co. (1871), 43 N. Y.
x63; Venderbeck v. Hendry (1871), 34
502; Central Br. U. P. R. R. Co. v.
N. 3. L. 467.
Henigh (1880), 23 Kan. 347; Smith v.
Nor use dangerous or hazardous in- R.R. Co. (1881), 25 Id. 738.
strumentalities, exposed where children
In conclusion, it is believed to be the
may get at them: Bolandv. R. R. Co. rule that, for injuries to children, sui
(1865), 36 Mo. 484; Wood v. School juris or non sui jurs, while on the
.Dist. (1876), 44 Iowa 27; Lyons v. sidewalk or street, whether at play or
Inha6. Brookline (1876), ii9 Mass.
not, to hold the defendant liable, if he
491; A'err v. Forgue (1870), 54 Ill. has failed to exercise the care required,
482; K effe v. R. R. Co. (1875), 21
irrespective of any other question.
Minn. 207; Nagle v. R. R. Co. (1882),
JOHN F. KELLY.
75 Mo. 653; Kansas C. Ry. Co. v.
St. Paul, Mum.
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A transfer by a tenant, of the demised premises, for the unexpired residue of his
term, is an assignment, making the assignee liable to the original lessor for rent,
though the instrument of transfer purports to be a lease, reserves a different rent
from that specified in the original lease, with right of re-entry and forfeiture for
non-payment, and provides for surrender of the premises to the original lessee.
The fact that the original lessor has refused to release his lessee from liability
for rent, and to accept the rent reserved in the assignment, does not estop him from
treating the transfer as an assignment.
That an assignment of a lease was made without the written assent of the lessor,
in violation of the provisions of the lease, is no defence to a suit by the lessor
against the assignee for rent.

Appeal from Appellate Court, first district.
On May I, 1885, Patrick J. Sexton leased to Frank F. Cole,
by two separate leases, for different parts of the building, a
certain warehouse in Chicago, for the term of three years, at
a rent of $466.66 per month. Nine days later Cole leased this
warehouse to the Chicago Storage Company, for the whole of'
his unexpired term, at a rental of $300 per month for the first
year, $5oo per month for the second year, and $650 per month
for the third year, with right of re-entry and forfeiture for nonpayment of rent, and a covenant by the company to surrender
possession to him, at the expiration of the term, or sooner determination of the lease. Sexton treated this second lease as
an assignment, demanded rent from the company at the rate
of $466.66 per month, and, on its non-payment, brought this
suit against the corporation and its stockholders, to dissolve
the corporation for having ceased to do business, leaving debts
unpaid. The Superior Court and the Appellate Court both
held the conveyance from Cole to the company to be a sublease, and dismissed the bill for want of equity, because the
defendants were not indebted to complainant.
Alexander S. Bradley (John N. Jewett and Jewett Bros., of

counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth R. Smoot and fonk & Elliott, for appellees.
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SCHOLFIELD, J., June 15, 1889. The evidence sufficiently
proves that "the Chicago Storage Company has ceased doing

business." This is not contested by counsel for appellees,
though they seek to avoid its effect by the circumstance which
they claim to be proved, that such failure is solely because of

the seizure and appropriation of its property for the payment
of rent due from Frank F. Cole alone to appellant

It is there-

fore manifest that, in determining whether the corporation has
left debts unpaid, so as to bring the case within section 25, c.
32, Rev. Stat. 1874, as amended by the Act of May 22, 1877,
in relation to corporations (Laws 1877, p. 66), the first and
most important question is, whether the Storage Company is
an assignee of the term of Frank F. Cole, or only a sub-lessee
under him, for, if it is an assignee of the term of Frank F. Cole,
it stands in his shoes as respects his covenant to pay rent, and
its property is liable to be seized and appropriated to the payment of the rent by distress, as was done. If, however, it is
but a sub-lessee under Frank F. Cole, it is liable only on its
covenants to him.
The leases to Frank F. Cole are "for and during" the terms
named, "and until the Ist day of May, I888." The lease executed by Frank F. Cole to the Chicago Storage Company is
of precisely the same premises included by the leases to him,
and it is in the identical language of those leases, "for and
during" the term named, "and until the ist day of May,
1888 ;" so that the terms all end at the same instant of time.
No space of time, however minute, therefore, can by any possibility remain after the term of the Storage Company has ended
before the expiration of the term of Cole, in which he could
enter upon or accept a surrender of the premises. The general
principle, as held by all the authorities, is that, where the lessee
assigns his whole estate, without reserving to himself a reversion therein, a privity of estate is at once created between his
assignee and the original lessor, and the latter then has a right.
of action directly against the assignee, on the covenants running with the land, one of which is that to pay rent; but if the
lessee sub-lets the premises, reserving or retaining any reversion, however small, the privity of estate between the sub-lessee
and the original landlord is not established, and the latter has
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no right of action against the former, there being neither privity
of contract nor privity of estate between them. The chief difficulty has been in determining what constitutes such reservation of a reversion. The more recent English decisions, and
all of the text-books treating of the question, which have been
accessible to us, hold that, where all of the lessee's estate is
transferred, the instrument will operate as an assignment, notwithstanding that words of devise, instead of assignment, are
used, and notwithstanding .the reservation of a rent to the
grantor, and a right of re-entry on the non-payment of rent,
or the non-performance of the other covenants contained in
it: I Platt, Leases, 1-9, 102; Woodf., Landl. & Ten. ( 7th Ed.)
211 (1lth Ed.), 23 6; Wood, Landl. & Ten., p. 181, § 90; Tayl.,
Landl. & Ten. (8th Ed.) 16, note 2; Bac. Abr. tit. "Leases,"
H 3; 2 Prest. Cony. 124, 125; Beardnan v. Vilson (1868),
L. R. 4 C. P. 57; Doe v. Bateman (1818), 2 B. & Al. 168;
Wollastonv. Hakewill(184), 3 Scott, N. R. 593. Undoubtedly
many cases may be found wherein the lessee has granted to
another party his entire term, retaining no reversionary interest
in himself; and it has been held that the relation, as between
the parties, was that of landlord and tenant, or, perhaps more
correctly, lessee and sub-lessee, because such was clearly the
intention of the parties; but this was the result of contract
only, and not conclusive upon the original landlord, since he
was not a party to it. The relation of landlord and assignee
of a term, however, it has been seen, does not result from contract, but from privity of estate, and therefore, when the original lessee has divested himself of his entire term, and thus
ceased to be in privity of estate with the original landlord, the
person to whom he has transferred that entire term must necessarily be in privity of estate with his original landlord, and
hence liable as assignee of the term: See Wood, Landl. &
Ten. 182, and authorities cited in note I; Van Rensselaer v.
Hays (1839), 19 N.Y. 68; Pluck v. Digges (1831), 5 Bligh
(N. S.) 31; Thorn v. Woollcombe (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 586;
Carpenters' Union v. Railway CO. (873), 45 Ind. 281; Smiley

v. Van Winkle(I856), 6 Cal. 6o5; Blumenberg v. Myres(I867),
32 Id. 93; Schiing v. Holmes (1863), 23 Id. 227.
Counsel for appellees contend, and the Courts below ruled
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accordingly, that the reservation of a new and different rent,
or the reservation to the lessor of the right to declare the lease
void for the non-performance of its covenants, and to re-enter
for such breach, or at the end of the term, coupled with the
covenant of the lessee to surrender at the end of the term or
upon forfeiture of the term for breach of covenant, make the
letting by the lessee a sub-letting and not an assignment of the
term, notwithstanding the lessee has retained in himself no
part of the term; and they rely upon Collins v. Hasbrouck
(1874), 56 N. Y. 157; Ganson v. Tifft (1877), 71 Id. 48; McNeil v. Kendall (I88o), 128 Mass. 245 ; and Dunlap v. Bullard
(I881), 131 Id. I6i,-as sustaining this contention. There is
general language in Collins v. Hasbrouck quite as broad as
claimed; but no question therein presented called for its use,
and its meaning ought to be limited by the facts to which it
was applied. There, the first original lease was for the term of
IO years from the Ist of April, 1864; the second was for the
term of 9 years from the Ist of April, 1865. Thus both ex-.
pired April I, 1874. The sub-lease was for the term of two
years and seven months from the Ist of September, I867,jthat is to say, until the Ist of April, I87,-with the privilege,
however, to the lessee to extend the term four years, or until
April I, 1874, by giving two months' notice, etc. The plaintiff
claimed that the leases were forfeited by the sub-letting, and
the Court so held. No distinction was taken, in the opinion
of the Court, between an absolute demise until the end of the
term and a mere privilege to have the demise extended four
years, which was until the end of the term. We have held
that a similar clause in a lease is not a present demise, but a
mere covenant, which may be specifically enforced in chancery,
or upon which an action at law may be maintained for a breach
of covenant: Hunterv. Silvers (1853), 15 Ill. 174; Sutherland
v. Goodnow (I884), io8 Id. 528. And it would seem quite
evident that, in no view, could the reversion have passed until
after the grantee elected to have the term for four years longer;
and so, when the lease was executed, there was still a reversionary interest in the sub-lessor of four years, subject, though
it may have been, to be thereafter divested by the election of
the sub-lessee. In Ganson v. ifft, the sub-lease provided that,
VOL. XXXVII.- 3 6
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at the expiration of the term, or other sooner determination
of the demise, the lessee should surrender the demised premises to the lessors, and the Court said: "This constitutes a
sub-lease of the premises, and not an assignment of the term."
In Stewart v. Railroad Co. (1886), 102 N. Y. 6oi, there was a
demise by the lessee to the Long Island Railroad Company
for a term longer than that held by the lessee. There was also
a different rent to be paid than that provided to be paid by the
original lease, and there was a reservation of the right to reenter for non-payment of rent, etc. It was held that, as to the
original landlord, this amounted to an assignment of the lease,
and that its character was not destroyed by the reservation
therein of a new rent to the assignor with a power of re-entering for non-payment of rent, or by its assumption of the
character of a sub-lease. The Court, after laying down the
rule substantially as we have heretofore stated it to be recognized by the text-books and recent English decisions, said:
"The effect, therefore, of a demise by a lessee for a period equal to or exceeding his whole term is to divest him of any reversionary right and render his lessee
liable, as assignee, to the original lessor, but at the same time the relation of landlord and tenant is created between the parties to the second demise, if they so
intended."

Citing Tayl., Landl. & Ten. (7th Ed.) § io9, note; Id. § i6,
note 5 ; I Washb., Real Prop. (4 th Ed.) 515, note 6; Adamis v.
Beach (185o), I Phila. (Pa.) 99; Carpenters'Union v.Railway Co.
(1873),45 Ind. 281; Lee v. Payne (1856),4 Mich. io6; Lloyd v.
Cozens (1830), 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 13; Wood, Landl. & Ten. (Banks'

Ed.) 347,-and then adding: "These rules are fully recognized in this State: Prescottv. De Forest (1819), 16 Johns. (N.
Y.) 159; Bedford v. Terhune (1864), 3o N. Y. 457; Davis v.

Morris (1867), 36 Id. 569; Woodkzullv.Rosentkal(1875), 6i Id.
382, 391, 392."
In speaking of the ruling in Collins v. Hasbrouck, supra, after stating the facts, the Court said:
"In the opinion, the question is discussed whether the sub-lease amounted to an
assignment of the term of the original lease, or a mere sub-letting or re-letting of
part of the demised premises. This question, in view of the result reached on the
question of waiver, ceased to be contiolling; but, in discussing it, the learned
judge delivering the opinion made some remarks touching the effect of reserving a
new rent in the sub-lease, and of reserving to the original lessee a right of re-entry
for a breach of condition by his lessee, which have given rise to some confusion.
The features of the instrument, which are above referred to, would be proper sub.
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jects of consideration for the purpose of determining whether the relation of landlord and tenant was created as between the original lessee and his lessee, and bore
upon the question then before the Court, viz., whether the second lease was a subletting or re-letting of part of the demised premises, which contituted a breach of
the covenant not to sub-let or re-let. But the question of privity of estate between
the original lessor and the lessee of his lessee was not in the case. The determination of the question depends upon whether the whole of the term of the original lessee became vested in his lessee, and the circumstances that the second lease

reserves a different rent or a right to entry for breach of condition are immaterial."

And, after quoting many authorities to sustain that position,
the opinion proceeds:
"The cases which hold, that where a lessee sub-leases the demised premises for
the whole of his term, but his lessee covenants to surrender to him at the end of
the term, the sub-lease does not operate as an assignment, proceed upon thetheory
that, by reason of this covenant to surrender, some fragment of the term remains
in the original lessor. In most of the cases, and in the earlier cases in which this
docti ine was broached, the language of the covenant was that the sub-lessee would
surrender the demised premises on the last day of the term."

It is true that in this case, as has been before stated, the
lessee demised for a number of years beyond the term for
which he held; but it is impossible that, upon principle, there
can be any difference between a demise of an entire term, which
can leave no possible space of time remaining in the lessor,
and a demise for any additional time beyond the term; for,
since no one can demise what he does not have, all that can
pass by the demise, in the latter instance, is the entire term of
the lessor. If, here, the demise of Frank F. Cole vests his
entire interest in the property, as it professes to do, "for and
during" the remainder of his term, "and until the 1st day of
May, I888," it cannot be that any portion, however short in
duration, of the term granted him by the leases of appellant,
remained in him, because they are limited by the same words
precisely, namely, "for and during" the term, "and until the
Ist day of May, 1888." In McNeil v. Kendall (t88o), 128
Mass. 245, there were easements reserved from the effect of
the lease. In Dunlap v. Bullard (I88I), 131 Id. i6i, however, the facts are analogous in principle to those here involved; and it was held that the demise of the entire term of
the lessee was a sub-lease and not an assignment, because of
the right reserved in the lease for the lessor to re-enter and
resume possession for a breach of the covenants. But this is
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held upon the ground that, under the decisions of that Court,
the right to re-enter and forfeit the lease is a contingent reversionary estate in the property; the Court having previously
held, in Austin v: Parish(1838), 21 Pick. (Mass.) 215-223, and
Church v. Grant (185 5), 3 Gray (Mass.) 142-147, that, where
an estate is conveyed to be held by the grantee upon a condition subsequent, there is left in the grantor a contingent reversionary interest, which is an estate capable of devise. It has
been suggested that these decisions are predicated upon a local
statute, (see.Tied., Real Prop. note I, p. 117, and note I, p. 9o4,
6 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law.), but whether this be true or not,
the decisions are plainly contrary to the principles of the common law. The right to enter for breach of condition subsequent could not be alienated, as it could have been had it been
an estate; and Coke says: "The reason hereof is for avoiding
of maintenance, suppression of right, and stirring up of suits;
and therefore nothing in action, entry or re-entry can be granted
over:" Co. Litt. § 347 (214a). See, also, I Com. Dig. tit.
"Assignment," C 2, p. 688; 3 Com. Dig. tit. "Condition," 0
I, p. 124; 4 Kent, Comm. (8th Ed.) 126, 123 ; I Prest. Est. 20,
21; Shep. Touch. 117, 121. It is said in I Washb., Real Prop.
(2d Ed.) 474, 451 :
"Such a right [i.e., to enter for breach of condition subsequent] is not a reversion, nor is it an estate in land. It is a mere chose in action, and, when enforced,
the grantor is in-by the forfeiture of the condition, and not by the reverter."

To like effect is, also, Tied., Real Prop. § 277; 6 Amer. &
Eng. Cyclop. Law, 903; Tayl., Landl. & Ten. (8th Ed. § 293;
Southard v. Railroad Co. (1856), 26 N.J. L., 13, 21 ; Webster
v. Cooper (1852), 14 How. (55 U. S.) 488, 5Ol; Schulenberg v.
Harriman(1874), 21 Wall. (88 U. S.), 44, 63; Nicoll v. Railroad Co. (1854), 12 N. Y. 121.
It is true that, by section 14 of our statute in relation to
landlord and tenant (Rev. St. 1874, p. 659):
"cThe grantees of any demised lands, tenements, rents, or other hereditaments,
or of the reversion thereof, the assignees of the lessor oT any demise, and the heirs
and personal representatives of the lessor, grantee, or assignee, shall have the same
remedies, by entry, action, or otherwise, for the non-performance of any agreement
in the lease, or for the recovery of any rent, or for the doing of any waste or other
cause of forfeiture, as their grantor or lessor might have had if such reversion had

remained in such lessor or grantor."
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But this does not make what was before but a chose in action an estate. The right to enter for breach of covenant is
still but a remedy for enforcing performance of a contract which
may be defeated by tender: Tayl., Land. & Ten. (8th Ed.) 302.
As is said by the Court in De Peysterv. Mchael (1852), 6 N.
Y. 467, 507, in speaking of the effect of a like statute of New
York: "The statute only authorized the transfer of the right,
and did not convert it into a reversionary interest, nor into any
other estate." See, also, Nicoll v. Railroad Co. (1 854), 12 .N.
Y. 12 1, at p. 139. It follows that, in our opinion, the rule assumed to be followed in Collins v. Hasbrouck, Ganson v. 7ifft,
and Dunlap v. Bullard,supra,is not in conformity with the
common law, and that it cannot, therefore, be applied here.
The objection, that the written assent of appellant was not
obtained to the assignment, cannot be urged by appellees. The
clause in the leases, in that respect, is for the benefit of, and
can be set up by appellant alone. He may waive it if he will;
and, if he does not choose to set it up, no one else can: Webster v. Nichols (i882), 104 Ill. 16o; Willoughby v. Lawrence
(1886), II6 Id. II; Arnsby v. Woodward (1827), 6 B. & C.
519; Rede v. Farr(I8i7),6 M. & S. 121.
But counsel insist that appellant is estopped, by his conduct,
to now allege that the instrument executed by Frank F. Cole
is an assignment. We have carefully considered the evidence
bearing upon this question, and we are unable to concur in
this view. Appellant did refuse to acquiesce in the construction placed by appellees upon the lease of Frank F. Cole, and
to settle with them upon that basis. He refused to release
Frank F. Cole and accept the Storage Company alone; and he
refused to accept the amount of rent which the Storage Company obligated itself to pay Frank F. Cole as a satisfaction of
Frank F. Cole's covenant to pay rent to him; but he was all
the time willing that the Storage Company should remain in
possession, provided the rent due him by his lease to Frank
F. Cole was paid to him. He knew the terms of the lease of
Frank F. Cole to the Storage Company, and he afterwards received rent from it, and permitted it to remain in possession.
The lessee continues, notwithstanding the assignment, liable
upon his express covenant to pay rent; and the assignee be-
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comes liable upon the same covenant, by reason of his privity

of estate, because that covenant runs with the land: Tayl., Landl.
& Ten. (8th Ed.), § 438; 2 Platt, Leases, 356; Walton v. Cronly
(1835), 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 63; Bailty v. Wells (1859), 8 Wis.
141. Since appellant might sue Cole, on his express covenant
to pay rent, and, he having fled the State, take out an attachment in aid thereof, we perceive no reason why he might not
at the same time take garnishee process against the Storage
Company, and recover any debt which it owed him. There is
certainly nothing in this inconsistent with his ultimately enforcing his liability against that company as assignee of Cole's
term. It is not shown that the Storage Company has been, by
anything done or said by appellant, induced to do to its prejudice anything that it would not otherwise have done. No
judgment has been recovered against it, as garnishee of Frank
F. Cole, for rent due from it to Frank F. Cole, nor does it appear, otherwise, to have been compelled to pay money or incur
liability by reason of any act or word of appellant proceeding
upon the recognition of its being liable to Frank F. Cole, as
such lessee, only.
For the reasons given, the decree of the Superior Court,
and the judgment of the Appellate Court, are reversed, and the
cause is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The distinction between a sub-lease
and an assignment, is a fundamental
one, based upon principles of the feudal
law, and is wholly independent of the
form of the conveyance: whether this
purports to be a sub-lease, or an assignment, is immaterial: Thorn v. Moollcombe (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 586, 595;
Bedford v. Terhune (1864), 30 N. Y.
453; McNeil v. Kendall (I880), 128
Mass. 245, 251.
Under the feudal system, the owner
of a fee could not substitute another in
his place, without his lord's consent.
This restriction on alienation was
avoided by the practice of sub-infeudation, by which the tenant granted the
land to be held of him as he held it of

his lord, thus making the tenant an intermediate landlord. The Statute of
Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I., c. I, put an
end to sub-infeudation, so far as estates
in fee were concerned, and, accordingly,
wherever that statute is in force, it is
possible to become a landlord only by
granting an estate less than a fee, and
thus retaining a reversion: Van Rensselaer v. Dennison (1866), 35 N. Y.
393, 400.
Estates for years, being only chattel
interests, were not included in the feudal
restrictions against alienation, nor did
they come within the purview of this
statute: i Wash., Real Prop. (5th Ed.),
462. Hence terms of years could be
sold, even before the Statute of Quia
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The difference between alienation and
sub-infeudation, is the basis of the distinction between an assignment and a
sub-letting, in the present law of landlord and tenant.
Although this distinction is of so radical a nature, it is sometimes difficult to
determine whether a particular conveyance is a sub lease or an assignment. In
such cases, the test to be applied is this :
Does the original lessee retain a reversion ? In order to retain a reversion,
the estate he grants must he smaller
than his. Thus, a sub-lease creates a
new estate, while an assignment merely
transfers an existing estate into new
hands: Comyn, Landl. & Ten. 51, 52.
The transfers which have been found
most difficult to classify, are those in
which, as in the principal case, the
lessee conveys the land for the entire
residue of his term, reserving an additional, or different rent, with a right of
re-entry and forfeiture for its non-payment, and exacting a covenant to surrender possession to him, at the expiration of the term, or sooner determination of the lease. There are some decisions to the effect that such an instrument is a sub-lease: United States v.
Hickey (I873), 17 Wall. (84U. S.) 13;
.Dunlap v. Bullard(i88i), 131 Mass.

161: Collamer v. Atlley (i86I), 12
Iowa 319, 322; Collins v. Hasbrouck
(1874), 56 N. Y. 157, 161; but the
greater number of authori:ies, both
English and American, hold it to be an
assignment: Wollaston v.
azkewell
(1841), 3 M. & G. 297, 322; Beard-

man v. IVilson (1868), L. R. 4 C. P.
57; Doe v. Bateman (1818), 2 B.
&AI. 168; Smnith v. Alapleback (1786),
iT. R. 44i; hicksv.Downing(1796),
I L4. Ray. 99; Bacon's Abr. Leases I,
3; Bedford v. Terhune (1864), 30 N.
Y. 453; TVoodullv. Rosenthal (1875),
61 Id. 382, 391; Lloyd v. Cozens

et al.

(1830), 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 131; Palmer v.
Edwards (1783), 1 Doug. 187; Smiley
v. Van Winkle (1856), 6 Cal. 605.
In order to make the transaction anything but an assignment, the estate
granted must differ from that held by
the lessee, either in kind, or in degree.
But as it runs for the same length of
time as the other, it cannot differ from
it in degree. Nor does it differ in kind.
True, it is burdened with a new rent,
but that does not change its character.
If a man buys land, allows another to
acquire a right of way over it, and then
sells the land, the estate he sells, though
subject to an easement, is the same one
that he bought, since a right of way confers no interest in the land: Garrisonv.

Rudd(z858), 19 Ill. 558, 564. So,the
assignee's estate, though burdened with
a new rent (which is an incorporeal
hereditament, like a right of way), is
the very estate held by. the lessee.
Thus, too, it hrs been held that a conveyance of land, to one and his heirs,
reserving a perpetual rent, gives the
grantee a fee simple,-the same estate
as that of his grantor: De Peyster v.
Michael (852),

6 N. Y. 467.

Nor does the condition of re-entry
and forfeiture change the nature of the
estate transferred.
Thus, though the
sale is a conditional one, it is none the
less a sale. If one sells a piano or
other chattel, to be paid for in monthly
instalments upon the condition, that on
failure to pay any instalment, the title
shall revert to the seller, this certainly
is a sale and not a hiring: Latham v.
Sumner (I878), 89 Ill. 233: Lucas v.
Camfnbell (1878), 88 Id. 447. If land
is sold upon condition subsequent, the
vendee takes a fee, though his estate is
liable to be divested on the happening
of the condition: Nicoll v. Ar Y. &"
E. R. R. Co. (1854), 12 N. Y. 121,
132. The principle is the same in sales
of terms of years.
So, too, a mortgagee of the term, in
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possession, is held to be an assignee,
though his estate is at most an estate
upon condition: Astor v. Hoyt (1830),
5 Wend. (N. Y.) 617; Williams v.
Bosanquet (i819), i B. & B. 238.
As to the covenant to surrender the
premises to the lessee, it seems to be
settled in New York, that the insertion
of this clause makes the instrument a
sub-lease : Post v. Kearney (1849), 2
N.Y. 396: Collinsv. Hasbrouck (1874),
56 Id. 157, 161; Ganson v. 7ft
(1877), 71 Id. 48, 54; except when
the lessee attempts to transfer the land
for a term longer than his own: Stewart v. Long Island R. R. Co. (1886),
102 Id. 6or. These cases proceed
upon the theory that the covenant to
surrender gives the lessee a reversion of
an infinitesimal space of time on the
last day of the term. But this theory
does not seem to prevail elsewhere.
All the interest the lessee retains in
the land, after such a transfer, is a rent
charge, with a right of re-entry for nonpayment: Pluck v. Digges (1831), 5
Bligh, N. S. 42 ; Parmenterv. Webber
(1818), 8 Taun. 593. But a rent charge
is not an estate : Langford v. Selmes
(1857), 3 K. & J. 220, 228; Payn v.
Beal (1847),4 Denio (N. Y.) 405, 412;
Van Rensselaer v. Dennison (1866), 35
N. Y. 393, 4 o ; nor, a right of re-entry,
a reversion: De Peyster v. Aflihael
(852), 6 Id. 506. If then, the lessee
retains no estate himself, he must have
done more than carve a smaller estate
out of his; and the transaction is clearly
an assignment.
As to the rights and duties of assignees and sub-lessees respectively, the decisions are more harmonious. Sublessee and assignee are both tenants, the
former of the lessee: Langford v.
Selmes (1857), 3 K. & J. 228; the latter
of the reversioner: Sanders v. Partridge (187), io8 Mass. 556. The assignee stands in privity of estate with
the reversioner: Walker's Case (587),

3 Rep. 22; Borland'sAptPeal (1870),
66 Pa. 470; Lester v. Hardesty
(1868), 29 Md. 50; Done/son v. Polk

(1885), 64 Id. 501 ; Salisbury v. Shirley (x884), 66 Cal. 223. The sub-lessee
has with him no privity whatever: MeFarianv. Watson (1850), 3 N.Y. 286;
Bailey v. Richardson (1885), 66 Cal.
416, 421 ; Gibson v. Mullican (1883),
58 Tex. 430, 432.
Each can take emblements, if his estate is unexpectedly determined without
his fault: i Cruise Dig. 271 ; even
though it be on accotnt of the act, or
omission, of the lessee himself: Oland
v. Burdwick (1596), Cro. Eliz. 460;
unless it be determined by the foreclosure of a mortgage made before the
lease: Ljnde v. Rowe (1866), 12
Allen. (Mass.) 1oo.
The sub-lessee cannot dispute the
lessee's title, because the latter is his
landlord: Tilghman v. Little (185),
13 Ill. 239; nor the lessor's, because
the lessee, under whom he holds; could
not: Lee v. Payne (1856), 4 Mich. io6,
117; Doty v. Burdick (1876), 83 Ill473. The assignee cannot dispute the
title of the lessor, who is his landlord:
Carterv. Marshall(1874), 72 Ill. 6o9;
Green v. Wilson (1887), Ct. App. Ky.;
but may dispute that of the lessee, who
is merely his vendor: Blight's Lessee v.
Rochester (1822), 7 Wheat. (20 U. S.)
534, 548.
An acceptance, by the lessor, of the
assignee, as his tenant, while it leaves
the lessee still liable on his express covenants: Ghegan v. Young (1854), 23
Pa. 18; WJilson v. Gerhardt(1886), 9
Colo. 585; Oswald v. Fratenburgh
(1886), 36 Minn. 270; frees him from
his implied covenants, in whole, or in
part, according to the extent of the assignment: Walker's Case (1587), 3
Rep. 22.
But no recognition of the
sub-lessee by the original lessor releases
the lessee from any of his obligations.
Both assignee and sub-lessee, being

